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1. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has brought many new challen-
ges to the world. Yet, the post-Cold War era possesses a
few characteristics which are strangely reminiscent of times
preceding World War II. Prior to World War I1, and before
the rise of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the
West was viewed as a potential source of the means for
modernization and technological progress.1 Cooperation
with the West was an important part of the economic
policies of Peter the Great as well as Lenin.2 "Look to the
West" policies were also followed in Japan, during the Meiji
era, and were attempted by late 19th century Qing dynastic
rulers and the Republican government in China.3 The
purely political and economic characteristics of the West,
* Partner, Braverman & Linarelli; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center and the Catholic University Columbus School
of Law. I find myself in the habit of thanking Peter Fox, Partner,
Mallesons Stephen Jaques and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center, for his encouragement and guidance. His
insights have proven invaluable.
See Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance and the European Community, 84 AM. J. IN'L L. 284, 284
(1990).
2See id.
3 See James V. Feinerman, Japanese Success, Chinese Failure: Law
and Development in the Nineteenth Century (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author).
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such as multiparty democracy and capitalism, were not
influential during this period, however, since the Commu-
nist states, following Marxist doctrine, explicitly rejected
the market and democracy as the ultimate ordering
principles for a civil society. Additionally, democracy was
not vigorously pursued even in some Western countries.
The Cold War radically hindered and altered the
engagement between the East and the West in fundamental
ways. The result, in Central and Eastern Europe, was a
stark division between the Soviet and Western spheres of
influence.4 The Bretton Woods institutions, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund ("IMF" or "Fund") and the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("World
Bank") came into existence with charters that forbade the
involvement or consideration of political issues in their
operations.5 The rise of the Soviet bloc frustrated the
Marshall Plan for a greater economically unified Europe.'
Europe, in turn, divided into two economic hegemonies -
the European Community in the West and the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance in the East.
In the contemporary post-Cold War period, the states in
the former sphere of Soviet influence are radically transfor-
ming, both politically and economically. These emerging
states are in various stages of privatization, ofjunking their
inefficient planned economic structures in favor of market-
oriented economic systems. On the political level, they are
attempting to embrace democracy as a model for political
development. The political upheavals in these countries
are, in substantial part, due to the failure of the command
economic structure.7 Such fundamental transformations
require outside financing because there have been no
contemporary, effective banking systems in these countries
in recent history. In their transition from socialism, these
4 See Grzybowski, supra note 1, at 284.
5 See Articles of Agreement for the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, 60 Stat. 1440,
1449, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, 158.
6 See Grzybowski, supra note 1, at 284-85.
' See Michael P. Malloy, Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in
a Changing World, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1911, 1924-28 (1994).
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states need not only development, but reconstruction as
well.8
At the time of these changes, several positive trends
appear to be emerging from the rubble of the Cold War.
Significant among these trends is an emphasis on, and
optimism among states for, multilateral action.9 This focus
on multilateralism manifests itself in the economic sphere,
with, for example, the creation of the World Trade Or-
ganization, and in the political sphere, with United Nations
Security Council action in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and elsewhere. A second significant trend, at
least in Europe, is the emergence of a norm of democratic
public order, an emerging right of peoples to democratic
governance.10  This norm or right has significant
ramifications for peace, as international relations theorists
have demonstrated a substantial correlation between the
existence of democracy and peace. 1 A third trend, ap-
parent in development economics, is the trend towards
market-oriented economics, or "laissez faire with a human
face," as the preferred approach for sustainable economic
development. 2
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("EBRD" or "Bank") is a significant manifestation of these
8 See id.
9 See John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move Toward
Multilateral Solutions Is Changing the Character of "International"
Law 42 KAN. L. REV. 605, 606-07 (1994).
See e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 46, 46-49 (1992); Thomas M. Franck,
United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 601, 621-22 (1990); Richard Lee Gaines, On the Road
to a Pax U.N.: Using the Peace Tools at Our Disposal in a Post Cold-
War World, 25 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 543, 585 (1993); Ibrahim
Gassama, World Order in the Post Cold-War Era: The Relevance and
Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK J. INTL L. 255
(1994); John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development: Legal and Policy Issues, 18 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV.
361.1380-81 (1995).
n'Democratic governments rarely start wars. See generally R. J.
RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOvERNMENT (1994); BRUCE RUSSETr, GRASPING
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD
(1993).
12 See James H. Weaver & Kevin M. O'Keefe, Whither Development
Economics?, 11 SAIS REV. 113, 128-29 (1991).
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three trends, and is itself a promoter of them. 3 The
EBRD's Articles of Agreement explicitly require that it only
provide financing in or to states which have embraced
multiparty democracy and market-oriented economics. The
purpose of the Bank is to promote the development and
reconstruction of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, the Russian Federation, and the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union. 4 Because its charter is
based in part on political conditionality, 5 a concept forbid-
"3 See Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, May 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1077, 1083
(1990) [hereinafter Agreement].
14 See THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, FINANCING WITH THE EBRD 2 (1994) [hereinafter FINANCING
WITH THE EBRD]. The Bank has operated in the following countries:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Id. At the time the Bank
was formed in 1990, the Soviet Union was still in existence. The Bank
has modified its operations to reflect the break-up of the Soviet Union.
"5 See Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1, 29 I.L.M. at 1084. The
term "conditionality" is primarily used in this Article in a manner
similar to Sir Joseph Gold's use of the term, in the context of the
International Monetary Fund, as "the policies the Fund expects a
member to follow in order to be entitled to the use of its resources."
Nicholas Kremmydas, The Cross-Conditionality Phenomenon - Some
Legal Aspects, 23 INVL LAW. 651, 652 (1989) (citing SIR JOSEPH GOLD,
CONDITIONALITY 1 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979)). The term is
also used occasionally in a restrictive sense, based on the context of its
usage, to comprise "a side condition designed to ensure the execution of
a contract." P. Mosely, et al., Conditionality as Bargaining Process, in
INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNA-
TIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 117 (Jeswald W. Salacuse et al. eds., 3d ed.
1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL BORROWING].
The first Article of the Bank's Articles of Agreement states that the
purpose of the EBRD "shall be to foster the transition towards open
market oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial
initiative in the Central and Eastern European countries committed to
and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and
market economics." Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1, 29 I.L.M. at 1084.
Moreover, the Preamble of the Agreement provides in pertinent part
that the contracting parties are "[clommitted to the fundamental
principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for human
rights and market economics" and welcome "the intent of Central and
Eastern European countries to further the practical implementation of
multiparty democracy, strengthening democratic institutions, the rule
of law and respect for human rights and their willingness to implement
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den to the World Bank and other multilateral financial
institutions,16  the EBRD is a unique multilateral
institution. The overt political nature of the EBRD's
mandate is a radical departure - a never-before-used
approach - in multilateral development financing
institutions. Indeed, the formation of the Bank has been
hailed as remarkable and described as both "the first post-
cold war institution," 7 and the "first institution of the new
world order.""8 The Bank is an apparent product of cur-
rent thinking in development economics with its focus on
small and medium enterprises, and its view that private
enterprise development and the entrepreneur are the
engines of development.' 9
From a financial or commercial perspective, the EBRD
is intended to deal with critical capital shortfalls that
eligible countries have experienced during their transitions
from socialism. Without capital, the embryonic private
sectors of these transitional countries would die an early
death. Commercial banks, however, are reluctant to invest
substantial sums in these countries because of, among other
reforms in order to evolve towards market-oriented economies." Id. at
1083.
16 See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, supra note 5, art. IV, 60 Stat. at
1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 158. The Articles of Agreement of the World Bank
provide as follows:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or members
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed
impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.
Id.; see also Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority:
The World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 159, 163 (1993) (arguing that the World Bank violates this
provision).
17 Mark Easton & Kathryn Rorer, The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development - Agreement Establishing the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 32 HARV. INTL
L.J. 527, 527 (1991) (quoting THE LONDON TIMES, Oct. 10, 1990, at 31).
18 PAUL A. MENKVELD, ORIGIN AND ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN BANK
FOR REcONsmuCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 96 (1991).
'" See Weaver & O'Keefe, supra note 12, at 113-14; see generally
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN
THE THIRD WORLD (1989).
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reasons, their adverse experiences with sovereign risk in
the Latin American debt crisis,20 the tendency of their
lending to relate significantly to the activities of their key
corporate clients, 21 and the lack of commercial bank
confidence in the creditworthiness of the emerging
governments and their privatizing or newly privatized
enterprises.2 2  Commercial bank confidence depends
heavily on political, legal, and economic reform in the
countries in question.23
The EBRD was created in part to alleviate these and
other obstacles to the infusion of necessary capital into
transitional countries. The EBRD views itself as a catalyst
for private capital inflows into its borrowing countries.24
The Bank has been very busy in its few years of existence,
although, until recently, it fell short on actual disburse-
ments of funds.25 It appears, however, that the trend for
20 See Eduardo Lachica, Banks Unlikely to be Big Lenders to Eastern
Europe, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1990, at C12; Michael R. Sesit, Banks
Reluctant to Bail Out East Bloc: Unsure Political Conditions, Damaged
Economies Make Lenders Cautious, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1990, at A9.
21 See Proposed U.S. Participation in the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Update on Exchange Rate
Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Development,
Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990)(statement
of Horst Schulmann, Managing Director, Institute of International
Finance) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Development].
2 See id.
2 See id.
24 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
1993 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
2 See infra note 26; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 44.
Given the Bank's recent creation, the Bank disbursed relatively little
of its committed or approved financing, at least until 1994. As of the
end of 1993, total board-approved projects amounted to over ECU 3.7
billion. Id. For a definition of ECU, see infra note 34. Disbursements
in 1992 and 1993 together, however, totaled only approximately ECU
675 million. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 44. In fact, in
1992, the Bank disbursed only about ECU 126 million. Id. In 1992,
only six countries benefited from disbursements. Id. In 1993, projects
in virtually all countries served by the EBRD received some form of
disbursements, with Hungary and the Russian Federation topping the
list. Id.
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disbursements is increasing.26 With the Bank's initial
capitalization set at ECU 10 billion, the Bank maintains
that it will fully commit its capital base by the end of
1997.27
Ultimately, the Bank emerged from a synthesis of
philosophies and power bases,21 with its main characteris-
tics negotiated as follows:
1) Environmental conditionality. The Bank is required
by its Articles of Agreement to promote and take into
account environmental concerns and the concept of sustain-
26 The Bank got off to a slow start, in that its loan activities
initially were somewhat low. The Bank attributed this to the restric-
tions in its Articles of Agreement and the lack of appropriate private
sector projects in Central and Eastern Europe. See EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, QUARTERLY FINANcIAL REPORT
2 (Sept. 1994). Since its founding in April, 1991, the Bank has created
a portfolio of 252 projects, with total funds reaching ECU 6.9 billion in
1994. See Anthony Robinson, European Bank Eyes Future Funding,
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 2. In 1994, the Bank's loan and equity
portfolio increased by 74%, for a total value of ECU 4.4 billion in
committed financing. See EBRD to Consider Capital Increase to Meet
Future FinancingRequirements, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 703 (Apr. 19,
1995) [hereinafter EBRD to Consider Capital Increase]. The Bank
committed to ECU 1.9 billion in 1994. Id. Also in 1994, disbursements
increased to ECU 591 million, almost 60% greater than in 1993. Id. In
1994, the EBRD disbursed more funds than in any other previous year.
See Robinson, supra, at 2. Over 80% of the Bank's financing has been
in the form of loans. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 13.
The telecommunications and financial institutions sectors have
comprised the largest elements of the Bank's portfolio in terms of value,
while the financial institutions, manufacturing, and agriculture sectors
have comprised the largest recipients in terms of the number of
projects. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 13. Although the
Bank has approved projects for 24 of the 25 countries in which it
operates, see EBRD to Consider Capital Increase, supra, at 703, the
Bank's activities have been most intensely focused in six countries -
Poland, Hungary, the Russian Federation, Romania, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia, see 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 13-
14. This geographical concentration may make sense in terms of
establishing a good track record for the Bank, and may at least in part
be caused by limitations in the Bank's Articles of Agreement. See id.;
The Lex Column: EBRD, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at 14. From a
development perspective, however, the countries that need capital the
most may be deprived by this approach. See id. at 14.
See EBRD to Consider Capital Increase, supra note 26, at 703.
For a detailed discussion of the competing "maximalist,"
"minimalist," and "no aid" philosophies which accompanied the creation
of the Bank, see Linarelli, supra note 10, at 365-69.
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able development in an environmental context.29
2) Political conditionality. The Bank is the first
multilateral development institution to have as its express
purpose the fostering of multiparty democracy, pluralism,
market-oriented economics, rule of law, and human
rights.30
3) Emphasis on the private sector. After hard bargain-
ing in the short period in which the Bank's Articles of
Agreement were prepared, the American view that the
Bank should focus on private sector development prevailed.
The Bank is required to invest at least sixty percent of its
funds in the private sector and in privatization."1 The
Bank combines the concept of a merchant or investment
bank with that of a development bank.32  This private
sector emphasis, however, is closely tied to the political con-
ditionality of the Bank and could be a means of
disqualifying projects in countries lacking significant
private sectors or sufficient movement towards private
sector development. 3
4) European majority. Although the United States is
the single largest shareholder and exerted some influence
during the creation of the Bank, the Bank is essentially a
European institution3 4 The majority of the Bank's shares
2 See infra section 2.1.o See infra section 2.2.
s' Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1088. See infra
text accompanying notes 122, 159, 202-03, 275, 279.32 See infra section 3.1.
3 This point was suggested by Professor Peter Fox,
The Bank is European in character, with an American influence.
See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE AGREEMENT ESTABLSHING THE EUROPEAN
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPLANATORY NOTES,
art. 4, reprinted in EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 55 [hereinafter EXPLANATORY
NOTES] ("The essentially European character of the Bank lent itself to
the denomination of its original authorized capital stock in the
European Currency Unit, the ECU."). The Bank was conceived by
President Francois Mitterrand of France and initially was proposed by
him in October 1989. Its establishment was agreed upon within nine
short months. See Easton & Rorer, supra note 17, at 527; see also
Steven Weber, Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, 48 INTL ORG. 1, 13-31 (1994) (providing detailed history
of the development of the Agreement which establishes the Bank).
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are held by the members of the European Union ("EU").
The Bank's client states also are members of the Bank.
The EU itself, and also the European Investment Bank
("EIB"), are shareholders.35 The United States holds only
10% of the shares of the Bank, and Japan holds 8.5%6
This Article attempts a detailed description and analysis
of the EBRD's activities and policies. Section 2 examines
two significant policies which are collateral to the Bank's
financing activities: the environmental and political
conditionalities of the Bank. Section 3 provides a detailed
analysis of the EBRD's policies that directly relate to
financing. Section 4 examines the role of the Bank in the
context of the EU and trade liberalization, and Section 5
provides some concluding observations.
The Agreement came into effect in March 1991 and the Bank began
operations in April 1991. See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1992) ("The idea of the
Bank was first conceived in October 1989, before the Berlin Wall came
down; it was inaugurated in April 1991 before the Moscow coup; and,
in a matter of months, it has become fully operational. It has a staff of
close to 400 from almost all its member countries."); Easton & Rorer,
supra note 17, at 527. The Bank maintains its headquarters in London,
although both of its Presidents have been French. See Easton & Rorer,
supra note 17, at 527. The majority of the Bank's shareholders are the
Member States that comprise the European Union. See MENKVELD,
supra note 18, at 101-02. The United States is the largest single
shareholder in the Bank and played an influential role in crafting key
provisions of the Articles of Agreement for the Bank. See id.
" See Initial Subscriptions to the Authorized Capital Stock for
Prospective Members Which May Become Members in Accordance with
Article 61, reprinted in Agreement, Annex A, supra note 13, 29 I.L.M.
at 1102.
36 See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUENT AGREEMENT 90 (1990) [hereinafter SHIHATA, A COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS]; William N. Gianaris, Weighted Voting in the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 14 FORDHAM INfL
L. J. 910, 930 (1990-91). Share interests in the Bank translate into
voting strength in the Bank's Board of Governors, since the voting
strength of each member is based on the member's capital contribution.
See id. As explained by Mr. Shihata, "It is important to note however
that resort to voting is rather uncommon in the [multilateral develop-
ment banks] generally where most decisions are reached through
consensus." SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra, at 90.
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2. COLLATERAL POLICES IN EBRD GOVERNANCE
The Articles of Agreement of the EBRD suggest a
two-part framework for analysis of EBRD policies. First,
there are collateral policies to which the Bank must adhere
- policies that do not relate directly to the commercial or
financial aspects of a Bank project. These collateral policies
are the environmental and political mandates of the Bank's
operations. Second, there are direct policies that the Bank
applies in its day-to-day financing operations - policies
that relate directly to the soundness of investments and
loans. This Section examines collateral policies.3 7
2.1. Environmental Protection: Implementation of the
EBRD's Environmental Mandate
The EBRD's Articles of Agreement expressly require the
EBRD to take measures "to promote in the full range of its
activities environmentally sound and sustainable develop-
ment." 8 This is the first instance in which the charter of
a development institution formally required that the
institution take environmental issues into account in its
activities. 9 The Bank interprets this provision to provide
"a clear and proactive operational mandate.., on environ-
" The dichotomy between direct and collateral policies is from JOHN
CIBiNIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS 942 (2d ed. 1986). For a discussion of the detailed policies
directly related to financing, see infra section 3.
" Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2(1)(vii), 29 I.L.M. at 1084. The
Explanatory Notes to the Articles of Agreement provide as follows
concerning this mandate:
Delegates recognized the serious environmental problems in
Central and Eastern Europe, and emphasized that principles of
environmentally sound development must be integrated into the
full range of the Bank's operations. Thus Delegates intended
"in the full range of its activities" to include all of the Bank's
activities, including technical assistance and all special
operations, and not merely that the Bank should be able to
provide support directly for specific environmental projects.
EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 34, at 54.
" Chris A. Wold & Durwood Zaelke, Promoting Sustainable
Development and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 7 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 566 (1992) [hereinafter Promoting Sustainable
Development].
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mental protection and restoration."40 One authoritative
text describes the EBRD's concern for environmental issues
as "increasingly influencing" the activities of other mul-
tilateral developmental institutions.4 1
The EBRI) has actively implemented its environmental
mandate on a project-by-project basis through policies and
procedures such as environmental due diligence, specific
and general loan covenants, and supervision and monitoring
during, as well as after, project performance.42 The Bank
also provides assistance to countries in environmental law
and policy formation, 43 promotes market-based environ-
mental infrastructure in the borrowing countries, supports
and conducts environmental studies and programs, and
promotes participatory pluralism on environmental matters
in the borrowing countries." The Bank, moreover,
leverages its environmental mandate by requiring its
financial intermediaries to adhere to the Bank's "Environ-
mental Procedures."
45
Since Bank financing is primarily accomplished through
loans, the Bank's Environmental Procedures seem to be
focused on loan agreements. 4'6 The Procedures, however,
should be applied to equity financing as well. Indeed, the
rationale for applying the Procedures in a comprehensive
manner to equity financing arrangements is compelling,
because the Bank may, as a co-owner of a private entity,
40 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: THE BANK'S POLICY APPROACH 1, in
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROCEDURES annex 1 (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT].
41 See SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 48.
Shihata describes the Bank's environmental provisions as containing
"modern language" which is interpreted to mean that the provision
reflects what is now considered good policy for multilateral development
institutions. See id. at 48-49.
42 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES 1-5 (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
PROCEDURES]; infra sections 2.1.1.1. to 2.1.1.3.
43 See infra section 2.1.2.
44 See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 1-2; infra
section 2.1.1.4.
41 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 41-42; infra
section 2.1.1.5.
46 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 42.
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assume environmental liabilities associated with both the
entity and the property of the entity.
47
2.1.1. Environmental Conditionality and Taditional
Risk Mitigation
2.1.1.1. Environmental Due Diligence
The Bank imposes environmental conditionality by
requiring adherence to an elaborate environmental due
diligence process during the evaluation stages of projects,
prior to financing approval by the Bank, and also during
loan negotiation." During this due diligence process, the
Bank, like any other financing entity, will determine
whether it will undertake the project, and if so, what types
of provisions concerning environmental protection and
management should be incorporated into the loan
agreement or share participation. The Bank's Environmen-
tal Procedures, including screening, environmental review,
and supervision, must be followed for all projects in which
the Bank participates.49 The purpose of the Environmen-
tal Procedures is to "guide Bank staff on how to exercise
environmental due diligence to ensure that each project is
environmentally sound, just as due diligence is performed
to ensure that projects are financially, economically and
legally sound." ° For many years, development banks, as
well as commercial banks, have performed due diligence on
financial, economic, and legal grounds. A bank could refuse
financing of a project if it failed to meet bank standards in
these areas. Today, banks additionally assess environmen-
tal issues in their due diligence processes.5 Such as-
41 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ROLES OF THE EUROPEAN BANK AND POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPLICATIONS 1, in EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES annex 3 (1992). For a
background discussion on the Bank's equity financing process, see
Linarelli, supra note 10, at 392-93.
48 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 1-11.
'9 See id.'0 Id. at iii.
51 See John W. Head, Environmental Conditionality in the
Operations of International Development Finance Institutions, 1 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 17-18 (1991).
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sessment is a clear form of conditionality, as a bank will
finance only those projects found acceptable to the bank on
environmental grounds.52 The EBRD has made it clear
that it maintains the unfettered right to refuse the finan-
cing of a project on environmental grounds. 3
In the Bank's process of environmental due diligence, a
critical juncture is environmental screening, when the
Bank's environmental staff determines the need for an
"environmental assessment" and an "environmental audit"
from the project sponsor. An environmental assessment is
an "intensive examination of the environmental impacts of
projects which are likely to have diverse and significant
environmental impacts."5 4 An environmental audit is "an
environmental study conducted to determine environmental
concerns and potential liabilities associated with a property
transfer or ongoing operations."
55
The Bank divides environmental assessment into three
categories. Category A is the most extensive assessment,
and is reserved for projects involving "[d]iverse and sig-
nificant potential environmental impact."56 Projects falling
within Category A include the development of petrochemical
plants, oil and gas development projects and pipelines, dam
and reservoir projects, and large-scale industrial projects.5 7
Category B includes projects with "[s]ignificant potential
impact which can be readily identified and quantified and
for which remedial measures can be prescribed without
much difficulty."58  Projects falling within Category B
normally require less stringent environmental analysis and
include electrical transmission projects, projects for the
development of general manufacturing, and telecom-munications projects.5 9 Category C is reserved for projects
with "[i]nsignificant potential impact" which do not require
environmental assessment, such as family planning,
2 See id.
3 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 7.
64 Id. at 51.
5 Id.
56 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 11.
" See id.
58 Id. at 12.
" See id.
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nutrition, and technical assistance projects. 60
The Bank requires an environmental audit of projects
involving property transfer, property lease, or modification
of an existing operation. 61 The purpose of an audit is to
"identify any environmental concerns which may be a
potential liability, either to the sponsor or to the Bank."62
Environmental audits are thus similar to due diligence
investigations conducted by commercial banks, foreign
investors, and parties to a merger or acquisition.
2.1.1.2. Loan Covenants
In furtherance of the Bank's environmental mandate,
EBRD loans may contain specific covenants concerning
environmental issues. The Bank's Environmental
Procedures provide that "[e]nvironmental requirements of
transactions which are identified as necessary during
project preparation and environmental review will be
incorporated into loan agreements as covenants."63  A
financing agreement cannot be finalized until appropriate
clauses concerning the environment are included in the
agreement. 4 Similar to all development banks, the EBRD
uses "Standard Terms and Conditions" in its public sector
loan agreements.65 Specific loan covenants may work in
conjunction with the Standard Terms and Conditions to
provide effective provisions governing environmental
matters.
With regard to loan covenants, the EBRD's environmen-
tal conditionality can best be described through an example.
In the latter half of 1994, the Bank approved a loan and
equity investment in SLOVALCO, a company in which
ZSNP, the Slovak national aluminum company, owned an
60 Id.
61 See id. at 6.
62 ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 34.
6 Id. at 5.
6 See id. at 21.
6 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS (Sept. 1994), reprinted in Memoran-
dum from Vicki Hitchcock to John Linarelli (Apr. 24, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS].
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80% share.66 SLOVALCO was created to finance the
completion of a modern aluminum smelter to replace two
polluting and inefficient smelters. The Bank's financing
was to assist ZNSP in its privatization and restructuring of
the aluminum operation. 7 An environmental audit and
Category A environmental assessment were conducted prior
to approval of the financing by the EBRD,6" which
resulted in an "Environmental Action Agreement" between
the Bank and ZSNP as a condition of Bank financing.69
Because two of ZSNP's smelters did not meet contemporary
environmental standards, the Action Agreement required
the immediate closure of one of the smelters and the closure
of the second smelter no later than three months after the
start-up of a portion of the new facility.0 Moreover, under
the current financing agreements, the EBRD will allow
continued production only if the plants are operated in
accordance with applicable environmental standards, which
will require additional improvements by ZSNP.7 ' Yet
another condition of the EBRD's investment, which was set
forth in an Environmental Remediation Agreement, was
that ZSNP take immediate steps to contain pollution at its
plant. 2 The Bank has thus incorporated extensive cove-
nants related to environmental issues in the financing
documentation for this private sector project.
In the public sector realm, the EBRD's Standard Terms
and Conditions contain an extensive set of provisions
relating to environmental protection and management. The
Standard Terms and Conditions provide as follows:
The Borrower shall carry out the Project or cause the
Project to be carried out with due diligence and
efficiency in accordance with sound environmental
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTS iN TRANSITION 14 (Spring 1995) [hereinafter ENVIRON-
MENTS IN TRANSITION].
67 See id.
6' See id.
6 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
See id.
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and other relevant standards and practices and shall
provide, promptly as needed, the funds, land,
facilities, services, and other resources required for
these purposes.73
The "due diligence and efficiency" aspects of this provision
appear to reflect the duty to cooperate in good faith found
in both the common law and civil codes. The presence of a
good faith duty in a public sector loan agreement is par-
ticularly prudent because an EBRD loan agreement may be
classified as a treaty governed by public international law,
which may be unclear as to the obligations of the parties to
a loan agreement, especially when compared to established
domestic law. 4 The domestic environmental laws of the
developing countries in question may also be uncertain and
undeveloped. Thus, the Standard Terms and Conditions
seem to set forth a general duty to act responsibly towards
the environment even in the face of international and
domestic legal uncertainty. Since the above provision does
not define the term "environmental and other relevant
standards and practices," these standards and practices
should be defined in the specific terms of the loan
agreement.75
Other pertinent provisions, dealing with suspension,
cancellation, and acceleration of maturity, exist in Article
VII of the Bank's Standard Terms and Conditions for
development bank lending.76 Although Article VII does
not appear to deal expressly with environmental issues,
7s EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 65, at
§ 4.02(a) (emphasis added).74 See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text.
'7 The World Bank places a similar provision in its loan agreements
rather than in its standard terms and conditions. Compare Sample
IBRD Loan Agreement and Guarantee Agreement, § 3.01, in INTER-
NATIONAL BORROWING, supra note 15, at 128 with INTERNATIONAL BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, GENERAL CONDITIONS
APPLICABLE TO LOAN AND GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS (Jan. 1, 1985) and
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO LOAN AND GUARANTEE
AGREEMENTS FOR SINGLE CURRENCY LOANS (Feb. 9, 1993).
76 See EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 65, art.
VII.
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when coupled with specific covenants in a loan agreement,
its provisions could be quite powerful. These Article VII
provisions allow the Bank to suspend - and eventually
cancel - the borrower's right to drawdowns and to ac-
celerate the maturity of the loan, if the borrower fails to
comply with the obligations of the loan agreement." The
suspension and cancellation provisions, moreover, are
cross-contractual or cross-conditional in nature. That is, if
the Bank suspends drawdowns under one loan, it may then
also suspend drawdowns under any other loan to the
borrower. 8 Thus, one breach of an environmental cove-
nant could result in the cancellation of all EBRD loans to a
given borrower.
2.1.1.3. Supervision and Monitoring
A third manner in which the Bank implements its
environmental mandate is by supervising and monitoring
compliance with the environmental aspects of a project
during implementation. As explained by the Bank:
Environmental supervision is undertaken while a
loan is being supervised by the Bank. It ensures
that the Project Sponsor carries out the environmen-
tal measures specified in the Agreement and takes
appropriate actions in cases of non-compliance.
Supervision will include checking both on the
monitoring carried out by the Project Sponsor and
reviewing the progress of environmental mitigation
or enhancement measures specified as part of the
project design.79
Although the borrower is usually required to perform this
" See id. § 7.01(a)(v); see also Head, supra note 51, at 17 (discussing
forms and enforcement of environmental conditionality in the operations
of international development finance institutions).
78 See EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 65,
§ 7.01(a)(v).
79 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 5.
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monitoring function, and to furnish reports to the Bank, 0
the Bank may perform its own monitoring with its staff or
through third parties." In the event that the borrower
misrepresents the environmental conditions to the Bank,
the Bank has a variety of measures at its disposal,
including, as explained above, suspension and cancellation
of loan drawdowns and acceleration of loan maturity, as
well as notification of the appropriate authorities, financial
agencies, and co-financers, who may also take action. 2
At the time of project completion, the Bank will evaluate
environmental issues, and may require environmental
monitoring to continue well after project completion."
These post-project monitoring requirements would typically
be included in the project loan agreement if the Bank deems
them necessary.' The supervision and monitoring
provisions allow the Bank to perform comprehensive
environmental oversight of its projects in accordance with
the express environmental mandate contained in its Articles
of Agreement.
2.1.1.4. Public Participation in Environmental
Decisionmaking
The Bank's express statement of policy on the issue of
public participation in environmental decisionmaking is as
follows:
Local participation in the economic transformation
process will be essential for the success of the
decentralization and democratization process in the
countries of operations. The Bank will ensure that
Project Sponsors provide adequate information on the
environmental impacts of projects to governments at
all levels and to the general public, especially poten-
80 See id. at 48; EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra
note 65, § 4.01.
8' See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 48 (citing
Environmental Staff Guidelines).
82 See id. at 49.
' See id.
8 See id. at 5.
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tially affected parties, and that the comments and
opinions expressed by these parties will be taken into
account in the project approval procedures of the
Bank.85
To accomplish its task, the Bank has prepared a document
entitled "Guidance and Procedures for Ensuring Public
Participation." 6 This document mandates procedures in
addition to those already required by the government of the
country or locality in which the project is situated. 7 The
Bank, moreover, may require loan covenants specifying
what the Bank considers to be adequate public participation
procedures as a condition of loan approval.88
2.1.1.5. Leveraging Through Intermediaries
Finally, the Bank has imposed its environmental
mandate on intermediaries. An intermediary is an
institution in which the Bank invests, either in the form of
debt or equity, which in turn lends to borrowers.8 These
intermediaries often are ventures between Western and
newly privatized banks in Central or Eastern Europe.'
Through such intermediaries, the Bank can make indirect
investments in projects that are otherwise too small for the
Bank to finance directly.91
The Bank's Environmental Management Policy provides
as follows with respect to intermediaries:
When the Bank channels its assistance through a
corporate or financial intermediary, standards and
procedures will need to be applied for each major
85 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 9.
86 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES FOR ENSURING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION,
reprinted in EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at annex 4 [hereinafter
GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES].
87 See id. at 1.
88 See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 9.
89 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES, supra note 42, at 51.
90 See id. at 41.
", See id.
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sub-project. For this reason, the Bank will assess the
overall environmental performance and capabilities
of the sponsoring organization to carry out the
environmental review of projects.... The Bank will
require that environmental quality levels similar to
its own be applied in cases of associated lending.92
This policy is similar to flowdown requirements that are
used in government procurements to promote environmen-
tal and social policies through the procurement process.
93
Intermediaries are required to report annually to the Bank
on environmental issues that are relevant to their
portfolio.94 The Bank has agreements with at least fifteen
banks in twelve countries that flow down the Bank's
environmental mandate.9"
2.1.2. Environmental Projects and Programs
In addition to the above environmental policies and
procedures governing the Bank's projects generally, the
Bank has engaged in financing and technical assistance
projects relating directly to environmental matters. The
Bank, for example, is significantly involved in financing
projects for environmental infrastructure - particularly for
the environmental clean up and environmental
management of the Baltic Sea and the Danube River
Basin. 6 One such project, co-financed by grants from
Finland and the EU's PHARE program, is for the
improvement of the facilities of the Tallinn Water and
Sewerage Municipal Enterprise, located on the Estonian
shores of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland.9" Ad-
92 See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 8.
9 See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 37, at 942-43.
9 See ENVIRONMENTS iN TRANSITION, supra note 66, at 20.
9' See id.
9 See id. at 7-11.
9" See id. at 7-8. PHARE is an acronym for Poland/Hungary:
Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy. Today the program covers
assistance to all Central and Eastern European Countries. See Gerwin
van Gerven & Takao Suami, New Legal Framework for Trade Relations
Between the European Community and the Central and Eastern
European Countries, 19 INTL Bus. LAw. 149, 157 n.21 (1991). Within
the EC Commission a special task force has been set up which is
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ditional environmental initiatives include the financing of
projects to increase efficiency in energy transformation and
transport.98
Furthermore, the Bank has set several environmental
policy priorities for Central and Eastern Europe and will
assist countries in: (1) the formulation of environmental
policy; (2) the development of laws and regulations concern-
ing the environment; (3) the adoption of appropriate
emissions and effluents standards; and (4) the development
of the appropriate institutional and managerial capacity to
enforce such legal and policy instruments.99 A "key
priority" for the Bank "is to assist the countries of
operations in adopting environmental policy instruments to
govern effectively the behavior of economic agents."1 00 As
for the base for the Bank's environmental policies, the Bank
relies on the principles of the EU. 10 ' In the Bank's view,
relying on EU standards will promote the harmonization of
environmental principles. 2 The Bank will consider more
stringent standards for geographical areas that have
particularly sensitive environmental problems.'
The Bank has recommended environmental policy
reform, reasoning that "most of the environmental problems
may be traced to inappropriate and distortionary economic
policies in the countries of operations."0 4 A requirement
for successful environmental programs "is the linkage with
a framework of structural changes which are initiated and
implemented by the countries themselves."
10 5
2.1.3. Some Legal and Policy Implications
In the environmental area, the Bank has taken on
self-interested, protective functions as well as proactive
policy functions. These two functions are not mutually
resuonsible for managing the PHARE program. See id. at 152.
8 See id. at 12-13.
9 See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 1-2.
100 Id. at 3.
101 See id. at 2.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 Id. at 1.
105 Id.
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exclusive. For example, the Bank's environmental due
diligence may serve both to mitigate the Bank's exposure to
environmental liability and to promote projects that do not
pollute the environment. The protective functions are the
traditional functions that any investor would perform in
order to protect itself. The Bank, however, has gone much
further than merely protecting itself by actively pursuing
specific environmental programs and imposing environmen-
tal conditions in its financing documentation. In actuality,
the Bank is doing much more in the environmental sphere
than in the political sphere.0 6
Legal scholars appear to address the environmental
issues relating to the Bank more than any other sub-
ject.10 ' The literature is either critical or recommends
various methods of implementation of the Bank's environ-
mental mandate. The recommendations center on the idea
of creating bureaucratic review structures in or by the
Bank. The creation of such a bureaucratic review structure
may be difficult as the borrowing countries are in transition
and are struggling to establish democracies. 0 8 One sign
or function of a working democracy is participatory
pluralism °9 - the effective involvement of people and
'06 See infra section 2.2.1.
107 See, e.g., Stephanie C. Guyett, Environment and Lending:
Lessons of the World Baik, Hope for the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, 24 N.Y.U. J. IN?L L. & POL. 889 (1992); Panel,
Present at the Creation: A New Development Bank for Europe in the Age
of Environmental Awareness, 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 77 (1990)
[hereinafter Present at the Creation]; Chris Wold & Durwood Zaelke,
Establishing an Independent Review Board at the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development: A Model for Improving MDB
Decisionmaking, 2 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 59 (1992); Promoting
Sustainable Development, supra note 39.
10s See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TRANSITION REPORT (1994).
'09 See Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
supra note 10, at 46. As explained by Professor Zaphiriou in the
context of the United States:
As a result of participatory pluralism in the United States,
American law reform is achieved by the balancing of opposed
interests in the light of proximate, reliable and readily acces-
sible experimentation within diverse, though basically com-
patible, social environments. The American legal establish-
ment, under the influence of a strong tradition of sociological
jurisprudence represented by Holmes, Pound, Frank, the radical
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groups in political decisionmaking, and not merely at the
voting polls. Institutions designed to involve public
participation should be promoted at the country or com-
munity level as well as at the Bank level.
Established and effective administrative procedures
necessary for public participation, as well as substantive
environmental standards, are not practical at the national
or subcentral level in the Bank's countries of operation
without the precondition of sufficient legal infrastructure in
these countries."1 The necessary legal infrastructure,
however, is probably inadequate in many of these countries
at this time. Furthermore, one must be wary of any
attempted transplantation of laws and bureaucratic
structures from one country to another that do not account
for country-specific idiosyncrasies in a rigorous, comparative
fashion.' Approaches that too closely resemble the U.S.
Llewellyn of the 30s, and the establishment Llewellyn of the
60s, is well aware that "[t]he first requirement of a sound body
of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and
demands of the community."
George A. Zaphiriou, Use of Comparative Law by the Legislator, 30 AM.
J. CoMP. L. 71, 93 (Supp. 1982) (citation omitted) (quoting HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 38 (M. Howe ed., 1963)).
11 See Present at the Creation, supra note 107, at 86 (arguing that
the EBRD should lend to projects promoting development of market
infrastructure).
... See Hon. Roberto MacLean U., Court and Statute Law in Peru,
28 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 490 (Dale Beck Furnish trans., 1980). The
borrowing countries of the Bank avoid what has happened in two
countries in Latin America. As described in the context of Peru:
In Peru, legislation often is drafted without the necessary
studies and information. The national reality has just begun to
be explored and, faced with a lack of facts and figures and
ignorant of precise situations to be regulated in many cases,
legislation is done "by ear," frequently working from the
legislative models available from other countries. Recourse to
comparative law as an aid to the legislator, if made injudicious-
ly, carries with it the danger of causing a serious distortion of
the juridical function. Laws are a reflection of the conflicting
interests existing in a society and its duty is to neutralize them
and put them in equilibrium. For this reason, when a law is
transplanted from one country to another, it may be that in the
new country the law does not satisfactorily resolve the conflicts
between interests, simply because the conflicts are distinct. In
such cases they remain at least partially up in the air and
without resolution. It then falls to the judge, if he is not
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National Environmental Policy Act"2 and other U.S. laws
dealing with environmental assessment may not be readily
transplanted to the countries in question without adapta-
tion. These types of laws are difficult to administer even in
the West; the practicality of their proper administration in
the East should be considered, for it may be worse to have
a law that is not obeyed than to have no law at all.
This is not to say that substantive environmental
standards should not be harmonized. It is axiomatic that
nature and its degradation by humankind know no political
boundaries. The Bank has taken steps in the right direction
by looking to the EU, rather than to the United States, for
environmental standards, since the countries of operation
share geographical proximity to the EU and many desire
EU membership. The procedures by which substantive
environmental standards are enforced, however, may vary
in countries to a greater extent than the substantive
environmental standards themselves.
The EBRD's borrowing countries should be alert to any
undue allocation of responsibilities placed upon them to
finance the massive investments needed for environmental
remediation and protection. Admittedly, the former
governments of these countries caused significant environ-
mental damage. Nevertheless, aid programs should
approach the problem of environmental remediation as a
European problem and not merely as national problems of
single countries. Since the environmental damage involves
externalities, the Western Europeans will benefit greatly
from cleanup in Central and Eastern Europe."'
content with formal solutions, to face the contradiction between
law and reality; between a foregone conclusion contained in the
model and the real conduct of people.
Id. at 490.
112 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1989 & Supp.
V 1993)).
... As explained by the economist Jan Vanous:
I am particularly disturbed by the suggestion that the Bank
should go into environmental lending. This is a cop-out. Any
economist will tell you that if you want to invest in the
environment there are lots of externalities. If I was an East
European I would say fine, lend me money, and I will clean up
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The externalities issue is related to what has been called
the "symmetry of adjustment" debate concerning con-
ditionality in structural adjustment loans made by the
IMF.T" The Fund makes short-term loans to countries to
alleviate balance of payments problems." 5 These loans
are based on conditionality - the Fund makes only a
portion of a loan immediately available and makes the
remaining portions available as long as the country meets
certain conditions, usually stringent monetary and fiscal
conditions." 6  Some scholars have argued that a
developing country should not be required to bear all of the
costs of this conditionality when its balance of payments
deficit is beyond the control of the borrowing
government.117 The argument is that there is a country
or set of countries with a balance of payments surplus
corresponding to the balance of payments deficit ex-
the environment, but the benefit is not only for me but also for
the neighbors. To demonstrate the illogic of the situation, why
would West Germany spend extra deutsche marks on something
that cleans up the West German environment that is costly on
a marginal basis, while if it only spent the same money fifty
kilometers eastward across the border the benefit would be
five-fold, and most of it would be felt in West Germany as well?
There is a very strong argument for subsidization of the
process. I think if the West wants the environment to be
cleaned up because it would significantly benefit from it, it
ought to subsidize it. The Germans understood this a long time
ago and particularly when it came to dealing with the GDR.
They figured out that if you want a clean Elbe River, you
should pay the East Germans and help them to build cleanup
facilities, so that downstream we do not end up with dirty
water. Environmental cleanup and things like that are very
costly and, in my opinion, ought to subsidized.
It is really the responsibility of the Europeans to get their
act together and start thinking like Europeans. If you want to
clean up Europe you have got to think globally now. You have
got to be allocating the resources rationally because the air
moves all around, you cannot contain it. If you clean up in your
own country it is not going to help if your neighbor is still
polluting. Your neighbor may not be able to afford the expen-
sive pollution equipment. Even if you give them loans they will
not be able to do it.
Present at the Creation, supra note 107, at 87.
114 -Head, supra note 51, at 21-23.
1,5 See id. at 21.
1 See id.
117 See id. at 22.
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perienced by the developing country, and, in appropriate
circumstances, the countries with the surpluses should also
bear some responsibility for alleviating the deficit.""
Similarly, the argument can be made that several
countries should share the burden of "environmental
adjustment.""9 Unlike the other multilateral financial
institutions that are restrained from pursuing such ad-
justment,2 0 the EBRD has an express mandate that could
allow it to pursue symmetry in environmental adjustment
in certain circumstances. Also, the Bank is not significantly
limited by principles of sovereignty because of its express
political mandate.' The Bank is, however, somewhat
constrained by its Articles of Agreement because at least
sixty percent of the Bank's investments must be on the
merchant banking side of the Bank. The Bank can devote
no more than forty percent of its financing to concessional
public sector lending, which includes investment for
environmental programs."2 This constraint is magnified
by the Bank's relatively low capitalization in comparison to
the World Bank and the Bank's aggressive market
maximization approach to investment.123  Given the
constraints of its Articles of Agreement and its own
self-imposed constraints, the Bank may not have the
flexibility to provide the concessional financing that would
promote symmetry of adjustment. The Bank has relied on
grant financing from PHARE and from member
governments to deal with this problem.'24
Additional restrictions on the Bank stem from what has
been called "the tyranny of the discount rate."'25 This
tyranny works both ways. The Bank's environmental
118 See id.
119 See id.
'20 See id. at 24.
121 See infra section 2.2.2.2.
122 See supra text accompanying note 31; infra text accompanying
notes 159, 202-03, 275, and 279.
' See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
14 See ENVIRONMENTS IN TRANSITION, supra note 66, at 7-8
(explaining that the Bank has relied on grants from both Finland and
PHARE for the Tallinn water and environment project).
' Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, 8 AM. U.
J. NT L. & POL'Y 19, 19 (1992) (citing EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN
FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 153 (1989)).
398 [Vol. 16:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss3/1
1995] EBRD AND THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
mandate can be interpreted as a restriction on investment,
particularly private investment. A project, such as a large-
scale oil and gas development project, may be highly
desirable from an economic development perspective, but
may not pass muster under the Bank's stringent environ-
mental review process.126 The environmental obstacles
associated with a project may cause the project to be
uneconomical, particularly if one applies market-based
interest rates to the project.
The Bank's task is made more difficult if one compares
the goals of sustainable development'27  and inter-
generational equity, fostered by the Bank's environmental
program, with the need for relative equities among Bank
members. 128  The idea of intercountry equity is closely
related to the idea of intergenerational equity, since each
generation exists and comes into being within the boun-
daries of countries in the present international order. The
countries in need of large-scale projects, which implicate
difficult Category A environmental assessments, may not
receive their fair proportion of projects, even though these
countries may be the least developed. These countries may
view a modicum of environmental problems as an accept-
able price for increased socio-economic welfare. The closest
that the Bank's Articles of Agreement come to dealing with
this issue of intercountry equity is in Article 13, paragraph
iv, which says that "the Bank shall not allow a dispropor-
tionate amount of its resources to be used for the benefit of
any member." 29 The apparent intent of this provision
was to prevent the Soviet Union, in the waning days of its
existence at the time of the Bank's formation, from swal-
lowing up the lion's share of the Bank's financing. This
126 This analysis was suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
"Sustainable development" has been defined as "development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs." IBRAMIfM F.I. SHIHATA,
THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 136-37
(Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991) [hereinafter
SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS] (quoting BRUNDTLAND COMMISSION, WORLD
COMMIssION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987)).
W This point was suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
12 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13(iv), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
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operating principle, however, is limited because it falls
short of providing for intercountry equity.
Environmental protection and management can be
viewed from a rights paradigm. A right to development has
been articulated, but not without controversy.3 0 The
"right" to a clean environment is bound together with other
economic and social rights, such as the rights to basic
nutrition, education, health care, and housing."' s In the
taxonomy of human rights, there is a well-established
distinction between economic and social rights and civil and
political rights .1 2 The Bank interprets its political man-
date as encompassing primarily civil and political
rights. 33 The Bank's environmental mandate, however,
is in the category of economic and social rights. The World
Bank, in part, justifies its involvement in environmental
matters by broadly interpreting its mission as essentially
the promotion of economic and social rights."3 In this
sense, the EBRD is really no different than the World Bank
or any other multilateral development institution. In fact,
given the Bank's conclusion that many environmental
problems are caused by structural economic problems,
3 5
the Bank has essentially admitted that it may have less
power than the World Bank, since the EBRD, unlike the
World Bank, cannot make policy-based loans.3 6
2.2. Post-Cold War Orthodoxy in the EBRD's Articles of
Agreement
The Preamble of the EBRD's Articles of Agreement sets
forth important underpinnings for the Bank's existence,
including a commitment by the contracting parties to the
"fundamental principles of multiparty democracy, the rule
"' Compare Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an
Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INTVL L. 287 (1983) with Jack
Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of
the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 473 (1985).
131 See SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 97-134.
132 See LouIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 988 (2d ed. 1987).
133 See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
134 See SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 97-134.
135 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
13r See infra section 3.2.2.
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of law, respect for human rights and market
economics."137 In addition, Article 1 of the Bank's Articles
of Agreement sets forth the Bank's purpose as follows:
In contributing to economic progress and reconstruc-
tion, the purpose of the Bank shall be to foster the
transition towards open market oriented economies
and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative
in the Central and Eastern European countries
committed to and applying the principles of multipar-
ty democracy, pluralism and market economics.13
Furthermore, paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Bank's Articles
of Agreement provides that "[t]he resources and facilities of
the Bank shall be used exclusively to implement the
purpose and carry out the functions set forth, respectively,
in Articles 1 and 2 of this Agreement."139  Finally,
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 provides that:
The Bank may conduct its operations in countries
from Central and Eastern Europe which are
proceeding steadily in the transition towards
137 Agreement, supra note 13, pmbl., 29 I.L.M. at 1083. Additional-
ly, the Preamble refers to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), and its Declaration on
Principles, which has set forth significant principles in providing for an
emerging right of democratic self governance. See Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, reprinted in FROM
HELSINKI TO VIENNA: BASIC DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS 43
(Arie Bloed ed., 1990) [hereinafter Final Act]; Franck, The Emerging
Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 10, at 66-69; see also
Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in
Support of Democracy, 34 HARV. INVL L.J. 163 (1993) (discussing the
Copenhagen Document, an instrument adopted by the CSCE which
emphasizes the importance of freely elected governments). Finally, the
Preamble welcomes "the intent of Central and Eastern European
countries to further the practical implementation of multiparty
democracy, strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law and
respect for human rights and their willingness to implement reforms in
order to evolve towards market-oriented economies." Agreement, supra
note 13, pmbl., 29 I.L.M. at 1083.
131 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 1, 29 I.L.M. at 1084.
"9 Id. art. 8(1) at 1086.
401
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
market-oriented economies and the promotion of
private and entrepreneurial initiative, and which
apply, by concrete steps and otherwise, the principles
as set forth in Article 1 of this Agreement.14 °
The Board of Directors of the Bank is to review, at least
annually,14 1 the Bank's operations "to ensure that the
purpose of the Bank, including by implication the political
aspects of its mandate, is fully served."
142
2.2.1. The EBRD's Implementation of its Political
Mandate: Conditionality or Traditional Risk
Mitigation?
In analyzing the Bank's political mandate, it is instruct-
ive to examine the conditionality that other institutions
impose in the context of policy-based loans. Although the
EBRD lacks the authority to make such policy-based
loans,143 the terms of these loans are nevertheless instruc-
tive because it is in policy-based loans that one is likely to
find "policy conditions."
An international financial institution would impose
conditionality on policy-based loans for essentially two
reasons: first, to create a substitute for collateral, and
second, to induce behavior that is perceived as beneficial by
the lending institution.'" The first reason would also
support the existence of conditions in project-based loans.
An example of the first type of conditionality is that
imposed by the IMF in its stand-by agreements. 4 5 The
140 Id. art. 8(2).
141 "The Board of Directors shall review at least annually the Bank's
operations and lending strategy in each recipient country to ensure that
the purpose and the functions of the Bank, as set out in Articles 1 and
2 of this Agreement, are fully served." Id. at 11(2)(i) at 1088.
142 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (citation omitted) [hereinafter
POLITICAL ASPECTS]. For a detailed analysis of the forces behind the
creation of the Bank's political mandate, see Linarelli, supra note 10,
at 375-76.
143 See infra section 3.2.2.
144 See Mosely et al., supra note 15, at 117-19.
'45 See id. at 118.
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Fund's loans are often designed to alleviate balance of
payments difficulties. 46  The conditions are designed to
increase the likelihood of loan repayment and to provide
assurances to the Fund that the loan will be repaid.47
An example of the second type of conditionality, where
the lender attempts to induce beneficial behavior, is that
imposed by the World Bank in its policy-based loans.1
World Bank conditionality for these types of loans is not
intended to maximize probability of loan repayment, but "to
enable the borrower to remove what the lender sees as
fundamental policy-induced obstacles to economic
growth.
" 149
Notably, neither the World Bank nor the IMF can take
political considerations into account in their financing
operations, except in the examination of the political risk
for a given loan. 50 In this sense, political considerations,
to the extent that they do not involve governance issues,
can, at best, form a basis for the assumptions underlying
loans, and only may be considered when domestic political
circumstances place unacceptable risks on loan or project
146 See id. at 117.
As explained in one authoritative text:
[f there exist government policies which can reliably be
expected to increase the likelihood of repayment of the loan, the
lender mad insist on the implementation of these policies, and
suspend disbursement of the loan if the policies are not
implemented. This is of course precisely the threat strategy
employed by the IMF, which ... as a general rule requires
borrowing governments to implement a package of
macroeconomic policy conditions which it believes will improve
the balance of payments. These "policy conditions" vary from
country to country .... The effectiveness of these conditions,
and their political and social consequences, remain of course the
subject of strenuous controversy, but in the midst of all this,
[some] things remain clear and undisputed: the purpose of IMF
conditions is to serve as a substitute for collateral, by increasing
the likelihood of loan repayment and giving the lender an early
warning of potential repayment difficulties; the conditions are
defined in terms of unambiguous, and monitorable, performance
indicators ....
Id. at 117-18.
148 See id. at 118.
149 id.
... See infra text accompanying notes 168-70; see also Head supra
note 9, at 637-38.
403
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
performance.
Although its express political mandate affords it greater
opportunities to act,' 51 the EBRD appears to be doing
even less than the World Bank and the IMF with respect to
political considerations. Despite its express political
mandate, the Bank made a decision early on to assess the
political progress of the borrowing countries on an annual
basis, rather than on a project-by-project basis.'5 2 The
Bank has de-emphasized political issues in its ac-
tivities.'53 The Bank essentially engages in surveillance
functions designed to ensure that it provides financial
assistance only to those countries that comply with the
Bank's political criteria.5  The Bank's political con-
ditionality is thus not true "conditionality," in the sense
that a borrower must fulfill certain conditions in order to be
eligible for tranches'5 5 or drawdowns, or in the sense that
the lender seeks to provide incentives during loan ad-
ministration. The Bank's political mandate is implemented
more in the nature of underlying assumptions concerning a
country's political status.'5 6  Political conditionality is
more a restraint on the Bank generally than a condition on
the Bank's financing. This political conditionality is in
contrast to the Bank's implementation of environmental
conditionality. With respect to environmental issues, the
Bank has imposed conditions more in the nature of the
second type of conditionality, to induce behavior that the
151 No other international financial institution has such a political
mandate, and the significance of this mandate is "difficult to exag-
gerate." See Head, supra note 9, at 638.
152 See POLITICAL ASPECTS, supra note 142, at 4.
153 See Janet Guyon, European Bank Gets Down to Business: Under
de Larosiere, Lender to East Eschews Politics, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14,
1994, at A8F.
154 See POLITICAL ASPECTS, supra note 142, at 4.
155 Tranches are parts of a loan identified by a particular loan
currency or interest rate, as provided for in the loan agreement. See
EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 65, at 6.
156 Professor Peter Fox has suggested that the IMF makes political
considerations part of the assumptions underlying stand-by arran-
gements. See also Mosely et al., supra note 15, at 119 (stating that the
World Bank uses conditionality in attempts to influence economic
policy).
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EBRD perceives as beneficial.'57
Several institutional constraints, including a clear "clash
of mandates"158 in the Bank's Articles of Agreement,
preclude the Bank from doing more politically than it does
already. The Bank has a private sector focus and it is
required to place sixty percent of its financing into the
private sectors of its countries of operations. 5 9  Ad-
ditionally, the Bank possesses both development bank and
merchant bank functions. 60  It would be a serious
contradiction, as well as impose conditions on a private
sector borrower over which it would have no control, to
provide private sector loan or equity financing while
imposing requirements, derived from political con-
siderations, which affect the availability of the funds. '6
It would be extremely awkward and onerous for the Bank
to terminate private sector financing on the basis of
political considerations extraneous to the loan. Another
constraint on the Bank in implementing its political
mandate is that the Bank's Articles of Agreement specifical-
ly prohibit policy-based lending, 6 ' which would be a
primary vehicle for implementing political conditions.
6 3
One of the EBRD's effective tools, however, is its ability
to impose political conditionality through suspension of its
operations in a country. Article 8 of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement provides in pertinent part as follows:
In cases where a member might be implementing
policies which are inconsistent with Article 1 of this
Agreement, or in exceptional circumstances, the
Board of Directors shall consider whether access by
a member to Bank resources should be suspended or
otherwise modified and may make recommendations
167 See supra section 2.1.1.
158 Professor Peter Fox has suggested this "clash of mandates"
pagage.lan59 See supra text accompanying notes 31, 122; infra text accompa-
nying notes 202-03, 275, and 279.
See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
... Professor Peter Fox has suggested this contradiction.
16 See infra section 3.2.2.
' See SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYs, supra note 127, at 70-71.
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accordingly to the Board of Governors. Any decision
on these matters, shall be taken by the Board of
Governors by a majority of not less than two-thirds
of the Governors, representing not less than
three-fourths of the total voting power of the mem-
bers.""
The measures that the Bank may take include
postponement of proposed operations, restrictions on
operations, and suspension of operations.'65
As a counterbalance to its suspension powers, the Bank
appears concerned about unduly restricting private sector
or community incentives when faced with an oppressive
national government. For example, the Bank's guidelines
consider "curtailing planned public sector projects before
taking action on private operations" and "[w]ithin the public
sector, curtail[ing] state infrastructure projects before local
ones and endeavour[ing] to continue with its technical
cooperation activities as long as possible."
66
As for decisions based on political criteria that would be
inconsistent with sound banking practice, the Bank, as a
matter of prudence, "will need to consider carefully its own
financial position as well as the legitimate financial
interests of relevant third parties" 1 7 in any analysis of
the issues. The Bank must be careful not to place itself in
vulnerable positions, where it could be exploited by the
unscrupulous in countries with fledgling democracies. The
Bank thus appears to "condition its political conditionality"
on financial considerations. In a hierarchy of considerations
examined by the Bank in its operations, the Bank has
apparently relegated its political mandate to the back seat.
The essential difference between a Bretton Woods
institution, such as the World Bank, and a post-Cold War
institution, such as the EBRD, is that each lacks a different
type of discretion in the political realm. Because of its
Articles of Agreement, the EBRD must take political
" Agreement, supra note 13, art. 8(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1086.
16 See POLITICAL ASPECTS, supra note 142, at 5.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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considerations into account and limit its operations to
countries that meet certain political criteria. Of course, the
Bank does maintain some discretion in the identification of
the political criteria, and even more discretion in the
application of those criteria.
On the other hand, because of its Articles of Agreement,
the World Bank cannot take political considerations into
account in its lending activities. Thus, in the 1960s, the
World Bank made loans to South Africa and Portugal
despite resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly
demanding that the World Bank not provide financial
assistance to these countries because of their poor records
on human rights.168 The position of the World Bank at
the time was that its Articles of Agreement forbade it to
refuse financing for political reasons.'69 In the same
situation, however, the EBRD would be forbidden by its
Articles of Agreement to provide financial assistance.
Despite this political restriction, the World Bank has
interpreted its Articles of Agreement to provide it with the
discretion to consider political risk and governance issues
and their effects on the prudence of the Bank's lending
activities and in the Bank's international obligations. 70
The EBRD's political mandate gives the EBRD the easy
ability to impose "policy conditions" upon individual
projects, essentially at its election and as the circumstances
dictate, without the need for an analysis of whether the
Bank has gone too far in its concern over a delimiting
concept such as "good governance." 7 ' Such "policy con-
ditions" may reflect "hybrid" considerations that deal, to
some extent, with politics, but will most likely concern
matters of sectoral policy, such as issues of taxation,
enterprise restructuring, and competition policy. 7 '
A pragmatic view requires the acknowledgment that
decisions concerning political issues are made by people -
168 See SIHHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 77-79.
'6 See id. at 77.
1'7 See id. at 55-57.
171 See, e.g., EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, TRANSPORT SECTOR: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 39-40 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter TRANSPORT SECTOR].
172 See, e.g., id. at 37, 39-40.
407
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
both in the Bank as well as in the borrowing countries.
People "operationalize" the political conditionality of the
Bank.'73 Thus, political conditionality may be subject to
varying discretionary attitudes, which could expose the
Bank to allegations of abuse of power. The Bank's
implementation of its political mandate through broad
reviews of country conditions, rather than through specific
conditions in loan operations, may help the Bank to avoid
such allegations.
The essence of the Bank's functions, at least as set forth
in its Articles of Agreement, is "nationbuilding," a contro-
versial task. The Bank's Articles of Agreement focus on the
development of market infrastructure necessary for
countries in transition to move toward multiparty
democracy and- market-oriented economies. 74 The foun-
ding members of the Bank have invested the Bank with the
authority to assist countries in transition towards the
"correct" transition, as they have defined it.' 75  The
EBRD, however, may not have the financial resources to be
a dominant financier of this transition. Despite the political
connotations incident to the term "nationbuilding," the
World Bank also engages in it, although the World Bank
limits its "nationbuilding" primarily to assisting countries
with matters of governance, such as civil service reform and
legal reform.7 6 Regardless of the development assistance
provided by institutions such as the EBRD and the World
Bank, it is the borrowing countries themselves that must
ultimately create their own democracies.
7s This analysis was suggested by Mr. Sadah Saabneh in a critique
of the Article.
174 See infra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
7 For an explanation of the criteria that may influence the EBRD's
implementation of its political mandate, see Linarelli, supra note 10, at
377-78. That the founders of the EBRD invested it with a political
mandate is not the end of the story. What do the terms in the Articles
of Agreement, such as "multiparty democracy," "pluralism," "respect for
human rights," and "market economics," mean? These terms are, in all
probability, not capable of comprehensive definition, although it is
possible to identify criteria. For a discussion of the criteria of the
Bank's political mandate, see id.
176 See SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 79-93.
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2.2.2. Some Legal and Policy Implications
2.2.2.1. Potential Conflicts of Interest
The Bank has proffered significant reforms for its
countries of operations. These reforms can be found in the
various Bank papers which discuss "issues and options" and
operational policies for the different economic sectors of the
countries in which the Bank operates.17 7 Potentially, such
involvement with reform may create an organizational
conflict of interest for the Bank. The Bank may find itself
in the position of promoting competition policy in its
countries of operation while contemporaneously investing in
monopolies.17 As explained by the Bank:
[T]he Bank confronts possibly unique conflicts in its
dual role as both a Merchant Bank and a Develop-
ment Bank. That is because maximizing profits of its
private clients can sometimes be inconsistent with
maximizing social welfare. The potential conflict is
greatest where private clients have already succeeded
in obtaining government grants of monopoly positions
before approaching the Bank. Such cases raise
questions as to who is the Bank's client - the
would-be (or actual) monopolist who approached the
Bank, or the government who is the shareholder in
the institution? If the Bank approaches the
government on the issue, it will be working against
the interests of its (potential) private client in breach
177 See generally EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS POLICY PAPER (1993);
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENERGY
OPERATIONS POLICY (1992); EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS POLICY
(1992)[hereinafter FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS]; EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS POLICY (1992); EUROPEAN BANKFOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS POLICY
(1992)[hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY]; EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSPORT OPERATIONS POLICY
(1992); TRANSPORT SECTOR, supra note 171.
178 This point was suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
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of accepted practices.' 79
To its credit, the Bank recommends the maximization of
privatization and competition, views many of the monopo-
lies as temporary, and makes loans to monopolies only in a
manner consistent with its policies.8 0 The Bank has
offered the following as a potential solution:
It is suggested that the appropriate response in at
least most if not all cases should be to inform the
private client directly that a conditionality of Bank
participation would be that it must relinquish its
monopoly position or agree somehow to circumscribe
it in time or space to delimit the potential negative
impacts on the greater social welfare. It should
normally be possible to define such arrangements
which would still provide an adequate opportunity for
the private investor to recoup his capital plus a
potential return commensurate with the risks being
borne.''
The Bank thus has determined that some form of
project-based conditionality may be appropriate to avoid
serious conflicts of interest, even where a government in a
country of operation has granted a monopoly in accordance
with its laws. Notably, concerns over monopolistic positions
and social welfare may be in the realm of governance or
economic and social rights, over which the World Bank
contends it also has authority. The EBRD has not included
antitrust issues in its list of political criteria that it regular-
ly monitors,' although an express function of the Bank
is to assist countries "to implement structural and sectoral
economic reforms, including demonopolization."
183
Not only may the Bank encounter potential conflicts of
interest due to its dual role, but incongruities also may
... TRANSPORT SECTOR, supra note 171, at 40.0 See TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, supra note 177, at 5-7, 16,21.
"8' TRANSPORT SECTOR, supra note 171, at 40.
182 See POLITICAL ASPECTS, supra note 142, at 4.
18 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1084.
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exist between the Bank's broad goals and its ability to
implement its goals. For example, although an explicit
function of the Bank is to assist countries to implement
structural and sectoral economic reforms, which includes
demonopolization,"' it cannot finance such reforms.
18 5
This conflict between broad policy and specific action has
the risk of surfacing in economic sectors such as the
telecommunications sector.
2.2.2.2. Issues of Sovereignty and Implications for
Multilateralism
Some have suggested that unfavorable decisions by the
EBRD based on political criteria could expose the EBRD to
charges of interference in domestic affairs or infringement
of sovereignty.'86 These arguments of interference or
intervention fail to withstand serious scrutiny. So long as
its actions are consistent with its Articles of Agreement, the
Bank has sufficient discretion to take whatever actions it
deems appropriate.
As a threshold matter, the borrowing countries are
shareholders in the Bank. The Bank lends to members, and
these members have consented fully and freely to the
Bank's Articles of Agreement. Member nations have given
up a piece of their sovereignty in the execution of the
Articles of Agreement, which is a treaty.'87 In essence,
the Bank is a credit cooperative, providing valuable lever-
age of the capital of its members. The borrowing countries
accept assistance from the Bank'88 and allow their public
and private enterprises to accept such assistance, despite
the political conditionality of the Bank's activities, and with
full awareness of such conditionality. In light of the many
184 See Agreement, supra note 13, art. 2(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1084; see
also SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 57-58.'85 See infra section 3.2.2.
18' See Easton & Rorer, supra note 17, at 535. For examples of
difficult questions surrounding the sovereignty issue, see Linarelli,
supra note 10, at 378.
117 See Head, supra note 9, at 606-07, 627.
18 Should a member nation reject Bank assistance, the Bank is
bound by such a rejection because "the Bank shall not finance any
undertaking in the territory of a member if that member objects to such
financing." Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13(iii), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
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manifestations of consent, interventionist arguments are
unpersuasive.
If the members of the Bank were somehow "coerced" into
membership, then a valid intervention or interference
argument could arise: There is no convincing argument,
however, that any coercion surrounded the execution of the
EBRD's Articles of Agreement. The EBRD's Articles of
Agreement is a treaty."8 9 Article 51 of the Vienna Con-
vention of the Law of Treaties and Article 51 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International
Organizations, provide that the consent of a State "to be
bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion"
of the State's representative "through acts or threats
directed against him shall be without any legal effect." 9 °
Moreover, Article 52 of both Conventions provides that a
treaty procured by the "threat or use of force in violation of
... the Charter of the United Nations," which does not
191 is " 192include economic or political pressure, is "void.
The states that are members of the Bank, however, would
be hard pressed to prove coercion under these stringent
standards. Under these principles of international law, a
treaty is vitiated only in circumstances involving quite
drastic forms of coercion, and not merely on the basis of
unequal bargaining power.
189 See ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND
OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-29
(1994) [hereinafter BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS] (discussing the treaty-
like quality of the World Bank's Articles of Agreement which, like the
EBRD Articles of Agreement, are binding upon all member nations
under principles of international law).
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
51, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698 [hereinafter Law of Treaties]; Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations
or Between International Organizations, March 20, 1986, art. 51, 25
I.L.M. 543, 571-72 [hereinafter Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations]. Both Treaties are considered to codify
significant elements of customary international law. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 604 (4th ed.
1990).
191 See BROWNLIE, supra note 190, at 615.
192 Law of Treaties, supra note 190, 8 I.L.M. at 698; Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations, supra note 190, 25
I.L.M. at 572.
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Furthermore, there is no agreement among jurists that
could result in the delimitation of any "unequal treaty"
principle which would invalidate treaties not based on
sovereign equality of the parties. Although some newly
independent states favor the inclusion of an "unequal
treaty" doctrine in international law, many of the Com-
munist regimes which were the principal proponents of the
doctrine are now defunct, and Western jurists oppose the
doctrine on the grounds that it is too vague.193 The "un-
equal treaty" concept does not appear as such in the Vienna
Conventions.
Finally, quite apart from legal principles of consent and
coercion, why would a state want to disavow the Articles of
Agreement? It would plainly not be in its interest to do
so. 9 4 Developing countries typically have a strong voice
in international development institutions.'9 5  The
countries in transition have the powerful incentives of aid
from the West, and eventual membership in the EU. These
transitional countries are on their way to democratic
pluralism and market economics as a matter of choice and
not as a result of any compulsion by the West. Relinquish-
ment of a piece of sovereignty is so fundamental to the
treaty practice of states so as not to be of serious concern,
particularly when weighed against the benefits of EBRD
membership.
19 6
3. EBRD POLICIES DIRECTLY RELATING TO LENDING'97
The Bank has the authority to provide three types of
193 See BROWNUE, supra note 190, at 615-16.
1 See Head, supra, note 9, at 657 (stating that withdrawal from a
membership in a treaty organization could create problems in securing
external financing an may amount to "self-imposed ostracism" for a
sta See id.
' For a presentation of arguments against nonintervention
principles in Europe, and a discussion of the changing norm of
democratic governance in Europe in the context of the EBRD, see
Linarelli, supra note 10, at 378-81.
'" In addition to its loan operation, the EBRD also has the ability
to take equity positions in enterprises. This ability is discussed in
Linarelli, supra note 10, at 392-94.
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financing arrangements: loans to private enterprises, 198
loans to the public sector,' 99 and equity investments.0 °
Although the Bank combines the functions of an investment
or merchant bank and a development bank,201 it may
commit no more than forty percent of its funds to the state
sector.2  It is critical that the Bank provide financing to
the private sector, in order to avoid maintenance of un-
desirable state enterprises in the countries in question. °3
The Bank's private sector emphasis is intended to promote
economic reform in its borrowing countries and safeguards
against the potential for ineffectiveness in public sector
financing. It is a very difficult task, however, for a mul-
tilateral financial institution to unleash entrepreneurial
spirit in developing countries. 4
Because the Bank's Articles of Agreement contain
seemingly inconsistent mandates for the Bank to be
commercial as well as political, it is important to examine
the direct lending arrangements of the Bank.2 5  This
Section explores several issues raised by the notable,
unexamined assumptions apparent in both the Bank's
Articles of Agreement and actual operations, including: the
Bank's ability to operate as a merchant bank in countries
where actual merchant banks experience difficulties or even
insurmountable barriers to entry; the provisions and
policies that the Bank has chosen to implement its strong
private sector mandate; the appropriateness of traditional
'9 See infra section 3.1.
'9 See infra section 3.2.200 See Linarelli, supra note 10, at 392-93 for a discussion of the
Bank's equity financing arrangements.
201 See Andre Newburg, Eastern Europe and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development: New Policies and Programs for
Business Development, 28 INT'L LAW. 433, 434 (1994); supra text
accompanying notes 31, 122, and 160.
202 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(3), 29 IL.M. at 1088; see supra
text accompanying notes 21, 122, and 159; infra notes 275, 279 and
accompanying text.
203 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Development,
supra note 31, at 13-14 (statement of David C. Mulford); see also
Present at the Creation, supra note 107, at 82-83.
204 See D.R.R. Dunnett, The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development: A Legal Survey, 28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 571, 573
(1991).
205 See infra section 3.1.
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public sector lending; the Bank's assertion that its public
sector loans are international obligations; the inability of
the Bank to provide policy-based loans; and finally, in light
of its private sector loans, the Bank's controversial assertion
that it has preferred creditor status. This last issue is
important in determining the payment priority given to
external debt and preferences over other forms of debt.
3.1. Private Sector Lending
The Bank's Articles of Agreement provide for the
following three types of private sector loans: (1) loans to
private enterprises without restriction;2 6 (2) loans to
state enterprises "operating competitively and moving to
participation in the market-oriented economy;" 20 7 and (3)
loans to a state enterprise "to facilitate its transition to
private ownership and control." 208 Article 11 explicitly
provides that a state enterprise is not "operating com-
petitively unless it operates autonomously in a competitive
market environment and unless it is subject to bankruptcy
laws.
20 9
3.1.1. Important Loan Provisions
Set forth below is an examination of some of the key
provisions that typically appear in EBRD's commercial loan
agreements, including provisions governing interest rates
and margins, loan maturities and repayments, fees and
216 See Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(1)(i), 29 IL.M. at 1087.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(1)(v), 29 IL.M. at 1088.
Article 11(1)(i) of the Agreement states that the Bank may carry out its
aims:
by making, or cofinancing together with multilateral
institutions, commercial banks or other interested sources, or
participating in, loans to private sector enterprises, loans to any
state-owned enterprise operating competitively and moving to
participation in the market-oriented economy, and loans to any
state-owned enterprise to facilitate its transition to private
ownership and control; in particular to facilitate or enhance the
participation of private and/or foreign capital in such
enterprises...
Id. at 1087.
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expenses, recourse, security, and covenants.2 10 Because
the EBRD does not make terms and conditions for these
loans publicly available,211 this analysis is based on the
limited information that the Bank has made publicly
available.
As a basic principle, the Bank, in its private sector
operations, is required to follow established merchant
banking methods in order to avoid imprudent loans. The
Articles of Agreement provide that "[i]n setting.., terms
and conditions, the Bank shall take fully into account the
need to safeguard its income."21 2 No such provision exists
in the charters of other development institutions, although
these institutions as a matter of practice comply with this
principle of safeguarding income.2 13 According to the
Explanatory Notes to the Articles of Agreement, this
safeguard provision is intended to "avoid the risk of... [the
Bank's] operations being in practice subsidized from the
cost-free resources available to the Bank from members'
paid-in subscriptions."214 Moreover, Article 13 of the
Bank's Articles of Agreement provides that the Bank must
invest on financial "terms and conditions ... taking into
account.., the terms and conditions normally obtained by
private investors for similar financing....
2 1 5
3.1.1.1. Interest Rates and Margins
The Bank does not have the ability to make "soft" loans
at concessionary or subsidized rates; 216 therefore, it
typically sets its interest rates at a margin over a market
210 For a discussion of key bank strategies, as opposed to key loan
provisions, such as co-financing and syndication, the use of joint
ventures, and the encouragement of mixed equity and debt financing,
see Linarelli, supra note 10, at 384-85.
211 See Memorandum from Vicki Hitchcock, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, to John Linarelli (Apr. 24, 1995) (on
file with the author) ("Unfortunately documentation on private sector
proects is not available.") [hereinafter Memorandum].
132 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
213 See SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIs, supra note 36, at 63.
214 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 34, at 58.
216 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13(xi), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
216 Weber, supra note 34, at 20; U.S. Rejects Soft Loan Suggestion,
EUROPE 2000 LTD., May 1992, available in WESTLAW, Europe
database.
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benchmark rate. The benchmark rate is normally the
London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR rate").,s Each
loan agreement will set forth a formula for determining the
EBRD interest rate, usually by adding a margin to the
LIBOR rate."' Although swing-line options are a com-
mon alternative,21 the Bank apparently has not indicated
an interest in providing them.
The LIBOR rate would reflect the Bank's capital costs,
while the margin would account for risk and provide the
Bank with a profit.2 0 The added margin will depend on
commercial risks and country risks, although the latter type
of risk "is mitigated by the EBRD's status as a preferred
creditor."221  Moreover, the Bank has a AAA credit
rating.222 Given the Bank's touted status as a preferred
creditor and its AAA credit rating, the EBRD may be able
to borrow funds at lower rates than those typically provided
to commercial banks. Thus, the Bank could either earn a
greater profit than a commercial bank, despite charging
identical interest rates, or the Bank could earn a profit
equivalent to a commercial bank while charging a lower
interest rate. Articles 13 and 14 of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement, however, make it difficult for the Bank to
entertain the latter option of equalizing commercial bank
profit while charging a lower interest rate. 3
217 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5; Clyde
Mitchell & Duane D. Wall, The Eurodollar Market: Loans and Bonds,
in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 53, 53 (Robert S. Rendell ed., 1980)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW].
218 Id.
219 See ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, ANNOTATED SAMPLE
REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT 3 (Roberto G. MacLean & Jeswald W.
Salacuse eds., 1994) (A swing-line option allows "a borrower to choose
between LIBOR-priced and prime-based loans.").
22 See John E. Mendez, Recent Trends in Commercial Bank Lending
to LDCs: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution, 8 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 173, 185 n.95 (1982).
221 EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
EXTERNAL FINANCING: SYNDICATIONS AND PARTICIPATIONS 2 (1994)
(discussing financing for private sector projects) [hereinafter EXTERNAL
FINANCING]. See also infra section 3.3.
222 See EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 221, at 4.
223 See Agreement, supra note 13, arts. 13-14, 29 I.L.M. at 1089
(stating that the Bank must apply "sound banking principles" in all of
its loans).
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The Bank has indicated that it may use either fixed or
floating interest rates.224 Fixed rate loans by commercial
banks were common in the early 1970s,22 prior to the
Latin American debt crisis. A key feature of contemporary
Eurodollar credit transactions is a floating rate based on
the LIBOR -rate. 6  Commercial banks have shown a
preference for floating interest rates when lending to
governments of developing countries and, to the extent that
commercial banks lend at all to private entities in
developing countries, the risks would probably compel them
similarly to prefer floating rates in loans to such private
entities.227  Floating interest rates shift the risk of
interest rate fluctuation to the borrower,228 who, as a
result, could suffer significant debt costs if the interest rate
increases. On the other hand, borrowers could obtain the
benefits of decreasing interest rates in a floating rate
arrangement.229
The Bank has indicated that its loan margin "conforms
to conditions in the syndicated loan market" and reflects
country and commercial risks.23 0  This statement in-
dicates that the Bank may be placing various yield protec-
tion provisions in its loan agreements, like those typically
utilized by commercial banks.23 ' These yield protection
provisions shift certain risks to the debtor, such as the risk
of unexpected market occurrence, or the risk of suffering a
loss should the Bank deplete its funding because of the
borrower's failure to pay when due. 2  The Bank's risks
will depend on the thinness of its spread. Interest rate
provisions may be combined with other provisions, such as
224 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5.
22 See Mendez, supra note 220, at 185.
228 See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 219, at 1.
2 See Mendez, supra note 220, at 185-86. Commercial banks are
probably lending primarily to key existing corporate customers. See
supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
2 See Mendez, supra note 220, at 185.
22 See id.
230 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5.
23' For example, Eurocurrency loan agreements will sometimes
contain "yield protection" clauses meant to protect the lender against
market and regulatory risks. For a discussion of this yield protection
issue see GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 219, at 2.
2 See id. at 2-3.
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those governing loan maturities, to allocate further the
risks between the borrower and the Bank." s
3.1.1.2. Loan Maturities and Repayments
Loan maturities for the Bank's private sector loans
generally range between five and ten years, and repayment
of principal normally will be in equal, semi-annual
installments. s4 Although semi-annual installments are
the most common form of repayments, 5 the Bank will
consider longer maturities "on an exceptional basis."2
6
For example, the Bank will consider loan maturities of up
to fifteen years for public sector infrastructure projects.
7
The Bank is essentially in the medium and long term debt
market.
The shorter the length of a loan maturity, the less risk
the Bank assumes in a credit transaction.2" The Bank
can mitigate its risk of inflation and default through shorter
maturities. 9 Moreover, through shorter loan maturities,
the Bank can mitigate the risk that its interest spread will
become unprofitable.240 Given the problematic economic
conditions in the EBRD countries of operation, the Bank
may be tempted to maintain relatively short loan
maturities. Maturities which are too short, however, may
cause debt servicing problems in these countries, particular-
ly for enterprises that require longer term financing for
capital goods.241
Article 14, paragraph 3 of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement provides that the Bank's loans "shall expressly
state the currency or currencies, or ECU, in which all
23 For example, Eurocurrency loan agreements will sometimes vary
the loan maturities to allocate additional risk between the bank and
borrower. See id.
24 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5.
" See Thomas Moffett, The Mechanics of Eurodollar Transactions,
in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, supra note 15, at 415, 421.
26 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5.
2 See id.
238 See Mendez, supra note 220, at 185.
23 See id.
240 See id.
"' See id. at 186 (explaining the concept in the context of public
sector loans).
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payments to the Bank thereunder shall be made."242 The
Bank lends in hard currencies, usually the Deutschmark,
the United States dollar, or the ECU, and requires that the
borrower pay the loans back in the currency in which the
funds were originally provided.2 ' The Bank's reliance on
hard currencies is, among other things, a reflection of the
lack of significant medium-term debt markets in the Bank's
countries of operation.2 4 The Bank's approach reflects
standard commercial bank practice, although it is on the
conservative side, for the Bank could specify that the
borrower repay in any hard currency.
245
The Bank is exploring methods for loan financing in
local currencies. 24' At the present time, this would seem
feasible only for short-term debt in relatively small
amounts. The Bank, however, has set its minimum lending
requirement at 5 million ECUs. 247 The Bank, moreover,
is not interested in making direct loans to small and
medium sized enterprises, preferring instead to finance
such enterprises through intermediaries. 24 Thus, the
Bank's own policies may limit its options with regard to
lending in the currencies of the borrowing countries. The
Bank may be able to lend to small and medium-sized
enterprises in short term local currency loans where swift
payback on the investments can be conservatively identi-
fied, such as in the instance of great demand for a certain
product manufactured by an enterprise, for example.
3.1.1.3. Fees and Expenses
Article 15 of the Bank's Articles of Agreement requires
the Bank to establish and charge fees and expenses for its
operations. 249  The Bank charges the borrower various
242 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 14(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
243 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 4-5.
244 See id. at 5.
245 This point was suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
246 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5.
2 See id. at 4.
248 See id. These intermediaries would provide credit lines
guarantees, equity funds, and early stage capital. The environmental
conditions placed upon such intermediaries are discussed supra in
section 2.1.1.5.
249 See Agreement, supra note 13, art. 15, 29 I.L.M. at 1090.
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fees and expenses for administration of the loan, for
technical consultants, and for outside legal counsel." At
the time of loan execution, the Bank charges a "front-end
fee" to cover its administrative expenses." The Bank's
fee and expense allocations to the borrower are generally in
accordance with commercial practice.252 These fees reduce
the Bank's risk by allowing the Bank to recover some of its
costs and profits very early in the loan cycle. On the other
hand, fees and expenses increase the costs of borrowing for
the enterprises served by the Bank.
3.1.1.4. Recourse
The Bank may engage in recourse financing, nonrecourse
financing, or limited-recourse financing. For limited-
recourse financing, the Bank may seek from project spon-
sors performance and completion guarantees, as well as
other forms of support, "of the kind that are normal practice
in limited-recourse fnancings."
253
The Bank, however, will not seek governmental guaran-
tees for loans to private sector enterprises, including newly
privatized state enterprises. In this respect, the Bank
interprets its Articles of Agreement to provide it with the
option of seeking a guarantee only when the borrower is a
state enterprise. 254 The Ba's "fundamental goal" is the
development of a strong private sectorY.2 5  The Bank has
adopted the approach of the International Finance Cor-
poration.
The Bank has been developing nonrecourse project
financing methods, which "will reduce reliance on
government borrowing or guarantees," in order to minimize
250 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 6.
251 Id.
22 See id.
253 Id.
254 See SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYsIs, supra note 36, at 63.
25 Id. at 64.
256 See EXPLANTORY NOTES, supra note 34, at 58 ("To ensure that
private entrepreneurs took full responsibility for their commercial
undertakings, the Board shall follow the present practice of the
[I]nternational Finance Corporation in not requiring a member
government guarantee on loans to private sector enterprises.")..
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sovereign debt.257 One example is the Bank's use of the
Build-Operate-Transfer method of project financing. 8
3.1.1.5. Security
When the Bank requires security, it typically will
require that the security be on the borrower's assets.
Security based on project assets may include a mortgage on
fixed assets, such as land, plant, and buildings, or a
mortgage on movable assets, such as equipment.259 The
Bank may also secure a loan through assignment of the
hard and local currency earnings of an enterprise, a pledge
of the sponsor's equity, or the assignment of insurance
proceeds or other contract proceeds.
26 °
A mortgage, however, is effective only to the extent of
the adequacy of applicable laws and legal system. Even
though a mortgage may not adequately protect the Bank's
interest, the Bank may obtain a mortgage on assets in order
to preclude the borrower from granting security interests to
others, a standard approach in project finance.2  In
these circumstances, it is also standard for the lender to
obtain a pledge of the borrower's equity, as well as an
assignment of proceeds or an assignment of rights either to
operate the asset or to sell it to a third party.6 2 The
Bank has indicated that it will usually require its bor-
rowing companies to secure the loan with project as-
sets; 263 the Bank has not expressed an interest in ob-
taining rights to operate the assets or to sell them to third
parties, presumably because it does not want to become
involved in project operations. This policy of non-invol-
vement is prudent - the Bank should be involved in
banking, not in running projects.
The Bank may have other reasons for taking mortgages.
7 Newburg, supra note 201, at 436.
258 The Build-Operate-Transfer method of project financing allows
repayment of the loan from project revenues. See id.
259 See FiNANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 6.266 See id.
261 See Robert S. Rendell, International Project Financing, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW, supra note 217, at 39, 47.
26 See id.
263 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 6.
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For example, the Bank may want to express confidence in
the legal systems of the borrowing countries. The Bank,
however, may only rely on such security devices in countries
with legal systems in which it already has some degree of
confidence. In an attempt to enhance its confidence in the
legal systems of its borrowing countries and because
secured transactions laws in its countries of operations have
tended to be either nonexistent or insufficient, the Bank has
prepared a Model Law on Secured Transactions for con-
sideration.2 64
3.1.1.6. Covenants
As to covenants placed in its private sector loans, all
that the Bank makes public is that "[t]ypical project finance
covenants are required as part of the loan package [and]
[s]uch covenants, limiting indebtedness, specifying certain
financial ratios and other various issues, will also be
negotiated as appropriate to the loan."265 The Bank does
not make any sort of standard loan terms and conditions for
its private sector projects available to the public.266 This
is consistent with the practice of the International Finance
Corporation, and with the Bank's role as a merchant banker
in its private sector projects.267
3.1.2. Important Loan Policies
Bank financing is governed by thirteen operating
principles which are set forth in Article 13 of the Bank's
Articles of Agreement. The most notable principles are that
the Bank must apply "sound banking principles to all its
operations"268 and invest on financial "terms and condi-
tions which it considers appropriate, taking into account...
the terms and conditions normally obtained by private
investors for similar financing."269  The International
264 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (1994).
265 FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 6.
26 See Memorandum, supra note 211.
2 An evaluation of typical project finance covenants is beyond the
scoe of this Article.
8 Agreement, supra riote 13, art. 13(i), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
2G9 Id. art. 13(xi), at 1089.
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Finance Corporation, which the EBRD resembles more
closely than the World Bank, is not bound by such require-
ments. 70  The "sound banking principles" provision,
moreover, is not easily reconciled with the principle of
subsidiarity, which is set forth in Article 13 as well. The
principle of subsidiarity prohibits the Bank from under-
taking any financing when the applicant is able to obtain
sufficient financing from other sources on terms and
conditions that the Bank considers reasonable.2
These inconsistent Article 13 principles present the
Bank with a puzzling problem. 72 If a commercial bank
cannot make an investment because it would violate sound
banking principles, how is the EBRD to make the in-
vestment? One solution may be to interpret the term
"sound banking principles" as including sound "development
banking" principles.273 Under the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tions on the Law of Treaties, a treaty should be interpreted
"in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning" of
its provisions, and treaty provisions should be given the
meaning that is in their proper context and in accordance
with the "object and purpose" of the treaty. 74 It would
seem that "sound banking principles" could not be
interpreted to mean sound "development banking" prin-
ciples for the merchant banking side of the Bank. Such an
interpretation would be inconsistent with the sixty-forty,
private-public sector distinction set forth in the Bank's
Articles of Agreement.275 It would also deprive of sig-
nificance those Articles that require the Bank to safeguard
its income276 and to lend on terms and conditions normal-
ly obtained in the private sector for similar in-
vestments.2 77
270 See Dunnett, supra' note 204, at 589 n.35.
271 See Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13(vii), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
272 For the Bank's explanation of how to reconcile this inconsistency,
and for a further discussion generally on this issue, see Linarelli, supra
note 10, at 387-88.
273 This point was suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
274 Law of Treaties, art. 31, supra note 190, 8 I.L.M. at 691-92.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 31, 122, 159, and 202; infra
text accompanying note 279.276 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
277 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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3.2. Public Sector Lending
In the area of public sector lending, several notable
issues emerge. These issues include the limitations on the
scope of the EBRD's public sector lending to development of
market infrastructure, whether EBRD public sector loans
create internationally binding obligations, and the
problematic nature of the Bank's prohibition on policy-based
lending."'
3.2.1. Infrastructure Development Financing as
International Obligation
The compromise struck in the negotiation of the Bank's
Articles of Agreement is that the Bank may commit no
more than forty percent of its financing to the public sectors
of the borrowing countries,279 and that this public sector
financing is limited to the purpose of developing infrastruc-
ture needed for market-oriented economies. Infrastru-
2"8 Several other issues related to public sector lending, including
the importance of infrastructure development and the Bank's negative
pledge policy, are discussed in the authors previous article about the
EBRD. See Linarelli, supra note 10, at 389-95.
279 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(3), 29 I.L.M. at 1088; see also
Easton & Rorer, supra note 17, at 534-35; supra text accompanying
notes 31, 122, 159, 202-03, and 275.
280 See Easton & Rorer, supra note 17, at 535. The Bank's Articles
of Agreement provide that the Bank shall carry out its functions, inter
alia, "by making or participating in loans.., for the reconstruction or
development of infrastructure, including environmental programmes,
necessary for private sector development and the transition to a
market-oriented economy." Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(1)(v), 29
I.L.M. at 1088. The Articles of Agreement, however, allow the Bank to
count financing provided to state enterprises in transition to
privatization as financing to the private sector. Id. art. 11(3)(iii)(b), at
1088. The EBRD combines the functions of the World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation into one institution. See Matthew
H. Hurlock, New Approaches to Economic Development: The World
Bank, the EBRD, and the Negative Pledge Clause, 35 HARV. INTL L.J.
345, 371 (1994). Ibrahim Shihata, the General Counsel of the World
Bank, explains the EBRD's focus as follows:
Direct loans to member countries for investment projects, which
have been the main business of other [multilateral development
banks], are less emphasized in the EBRD Agreement, and are
listed as the last method of operation, confined to infrastruc-
ture, including environment programs, lumped together with
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ture development is of vital importance to the countries in
transition from socialism, and the Bank's development
banking functions may be more important than initially
thought by the Bank and its founders.8 1
In pursuit of this infrastructure development priority, a
key question emerges: are the public sector loan and
guarantee agreements of the EBRD international
obligations? While the loan and guarantee agreements of
the World Bank convincingly merit this status, it is much
less clear in the case of the EBRD.
When analyzing the treaty-making power of an inter-
national organization such as the EBRD, the international
legal personality of the organization does not necessarily
result in the authority to make treaties.282 The Bank's
Articles of Agreement must be examined and treaty-making
power may be implied by resorting to methods of
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement. 283  The
EBRD's Articles of Agreement authorize loan agreements
between the Bank and states and between the Bank and
state enterprises, as well as co-financing techniques
involving both private parties and other international or-
ganizations.28 4
technical assistance and conditional on being necessary for
private sector development and the transition to a market-
oriented economy.
SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 61-62 (emphasis
in original).
281- See Linarelli, supra note 10, at 390 (quoting Ibrahim Shihata in
the context of World Bank priorities). As suggested by Professor Peter
Fox, the concept of market infrastructure could also encompass certain
"natural" monopolies that may or may not be in transition to
privatization. Examples are monopolies in telecommunications, ports,
airports, railroads, power generation and distribution, and utilities.
Some of these monopolies may be demonopolized and subjected to com-
petition in the future, while others may not. See SHIHATA, SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 30 (stating that eliminating or reducing
public monopolies increases the scope of private activities). The Bank's
approach to this issue is to maximize competition and privatization.
For example, the Bank's operational policy for telecommunications is to
stress eventual privatization of virtually everything except local
telephone service. See TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, supra note 177,
at 16.
282 See BROWNLIE, supra note 190, at 683-84.
2 See id.
284 Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11(1), 29 I.L.M. at 1087-88.
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The Bank's direct agreements with states, in all likeli-
hood, are treaties, just as the World Bank's direct agree-
ments with states are treatiesY.2 5 The Bank's agreements
with state enterprises, however, would not be treaties
because the borrowers of such loans are not the subjects of
international law.286  The World Bank, to some extent,
sidesteps this problem because its Articles of Agreement
mandate government guarantees for all of its loans, and the
government is a joint debtor, not merely a surety.
2
8
7
Government guarantees for EBRD loans, however, are
voluntary and indeed are discouraged, so as to provide
incentives for private sector development."s  Thus, at
most, EBRD loans to state enterprises may be treaties only
to the extent that the EBRD obtains a government guaran-
tee that makes the sovereign a joint debtor. This may
likely be a small subset of EBRD loans.
In the context of determining the legal character of
EBRD loan agreements, the EBRD is more like the
European Investment Bank ("EIB"), which also has
discretion to seek government guarantees. 9  The EIB,
unlike the EBRD, however, makes its agreements subject to
municipal law.
229
As for syndications and syndicated participations in
public sector loans by private sector entities 2 1 such as
commercial banks, the analysis would be similar to that for
state enterprises as borrowers, since commercial banks also
lack international legal personality. It would seem to be an
extreme stretch to characterize an agreement in which a
commercial entity is a party as a treaty. In the appropriate
circumstances, the loan agreement may constitute a treaty,
while separate documentation for participation may not.
The situation may become even more interesting when an
international organization, such as the World Bank,
285 BROCHES, SELECTED ESsAYs, supra note 189, 32-34.
286 See id. at 38.
" See id.
28 See SHrnATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 63-64.
289 See BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 189, at 41.
m See id.
2-91 For a discussion of the EBRD's engagement in syndication and
syndicated participation, see Linarelli, supra note 10, at 384.
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participates in a loan or is a co-financier.
That the EBRD's loans may or may not be treaties does
not mean that, like the EIB, EBRD loans are governed by
municipal law. The Bank's Standard Terms and Conditions
for public sector loans reflect the World Bank's practice in
specifying international law as applicable to the loan
agreement, and by declaring that the loan terms and
conditions take precedence over municipal law.29 2 Section
8.01 of the EBRD's Standard Terms and Conditions
provides as follows:
The rights and obligations of the parties to the Loan
Agreement and the Guarantee Agreement shall be
valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms
notwithstanding any local law to the contrary. No
party to either such agreement shall be entitled
under any circumstances to assert any claim that any
provision of either such agreement is invalid or
unenforceable for any reason.293
Section 8.04, governing dispute resolution, discusses
international arbitration and specifies the following choice
of law:
The law to be applied by the arbitral tribunal shall
be public international law, the sources of which
shall be taken for these purposes to include:
(A) any relevant treaty obligations that are
binding reciprocally on the parties;
(B) the provisions of any international conven-
tions and treaties (whether or not binding directly
292 See BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 189 at 32-33, 38-39;
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO LOAN AND GUARANTEE
AGREEMENTS, supra note 75, § 10.01; INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE
TO LOAN AND GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS FOR SINGLE CURRENCY LOANS,
supra note 75, § 10.01.
293 EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 65, § 8.01.
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as such on the parties) generally recognised as
having codified or ripened into binding rules of
customary law applicable to states and inter-
national financial institutions, as appropriate;
(C) other forms of international custom, including
the practice of states and international financial
institutions of such generality, consistency and
duration as to create legal obligations; and
(D) applicable general principles of law." 4
Moreover, EBRD public sector loan agreements contain
provisions addressing matters not usually dealt with by
private parties, such as access to territories, tax
exemptions, public procurement rules, and exemptions from
foreign exchange restrictions.295
The above provisions, in appropriate circumstances,
could support the treatment of the Bank's public sector loan
agreements as treaties. Aron Broches, in the context of the
World Bank, has asserted that an agreement with such
provisions is governed by international law, and "that it is
only in an agreement between subjects of international law
that the application of municipal law can be wholly
excluded."29 The Bank and non-sovereign parties to its
loan agreements may not be in the position to exempt
wholly their agreements from municipal law, since all sides
to the transaction may not be subjects of international law.
It is unknown whether we will see any publicly available
court decisions on this issue because the Bank's Standard
Terms and Conditions contain a dispute resolution clause
requiring arbitration. 97
"' Id. § 8.04(b)(v).
"9 See id. §§ 4.03, 5.02, 6.01, 6.02; BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS,
supra note 189, at 32.
BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 189, at 33.
2 See EBRD STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 65,
§ 8.04. The significance of court decisions would not necessarily be that
they are binding judicial precedent, but that they would furnish
guidance on the legal status of the Bank and its loan agreements.
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3.2.2. Prohibition on Structural and Sectoral
Adjustment Loans
Unlike the World Bank, the EBRD cannot make struc-
tural adjustment, sectoral-adjustment, or policy-based
loans.298 Article 13(ii) of the Bank's Articles of Agreement
provides that "the operations of the Bank shall provide for
the financing of specific projects, whether individual or in
the context of specific investment programmes ... ."299
The Explanatory Notes for Article 13, at paragraph 3,
provide that "[i]n sub-paragraph (ii), Delegates described
the precise form of programme lending in which the Bank
could become involved as 'projects, whether individual or in
the context of specific investment programmes,' so as to
make clear that fast-disbursing policy-based lending is not
included."30 °
The interpretation of the Articles of Agreement, as
expressed in the Explanatory Notes to the Agreement, is
restrictive. 01 The World Bank has interpreted its Ar-
tides of Agreement to allow for structural adjustment
lending, and since the early 1980s the World Bank has
engaged in such lending.0 2 The World Bank's Articles of
Agreement provide, however, that "[loans made or guaran-
teed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be
for the purpose of specific projects of reconstruction or
m See SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 53;
Hurlock, supra note 280, at 372. Policy-based loans, which are typically
fast-disbursing, are loans made to promote structural or sectoral reform
in a country. See Cahn, supra note 16, at 171. They are often made to
finance the reduction of a country's balance of payments deficit. See
SHIHATA, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 36, at 43. Policy-based
loans are usually made on the basis of conditionality - that the
country implement certain reforms aimed at inflation, public deficits,
restrictive trade and investment laws, exchange rate restrictions, land
reform, and tax reform. See Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) With the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1989 1999-2000 (1994).
Agreement, supra note 13, art. 13(ii), 29 I.L.M. at 1089.
300 EXPLANATORY NOTES, supra note 34, at 57.
301 This was point suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
102 See SHIHATA, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 127, at 25-27.
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development."3 °3
The clarification in the Explanatory Notes sets forth the
intent of the founders of the Bank. In negotiating the
Bank's Articles of Agreement, France proposed that the
EBRD have the ability to make policy-based loans in order
to promote macroeconomic reform.0 4 Other countries,
including the United States, argued that the World Bank
and the IMF already were making policy-based loans in the
region, and that these organizations possessed the technical
expertise to deal with these difficult loans.3"5 The latter
position carried the day, and the EBRD is thus limited to
making project-based loans.0 '
This narrow interpretation of the EBRD's Articles of
Agreement which prohibits policy-based lending, may
restrict the future evolution of the EBRD, and may inhibit
the EBRD's ability to remain a vital institution.0 ' The
World Bank has engaged in an evolution toward policy-
based lending in response to changing world needs with no
apparent deleterious effects, although the World Bank does
have its critics.
The lack of policy-based lending power by the Bank
reflects a serious flaw in the Bank's charter30 8  The
Bank's attempt at market infrastructure investments could
be seriously hampered by lack of authority to make policy-
based loans.3 9 The counter-argument is that the EBRD
restriction on policy-based lending is appropriate, and that
other development institutions should not provide these
policy-based loans either. Perhaps the prohibition serves to
mitigate conflict in a politically unstable region where it is
quite difficult to make policy-based loans in an even-handed
303 Articles of Agreement for the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, supra note 5, art III(4)(7), 60 Stat. at 1444, 2
U.N.T.S. at 144.
304 See Weber, supra note 34, at 17-18.
305 See id.
306 See id. at 18.
307 This point was suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
308 For a further discussion on the EBRD's lack of power to engage
in policy-based lending, see Linarelli, supra note 10, at 394-95.
309 See id. at 395. Indeed, the Bank's activities in sectors, par-
ticularly in the financial sector, suggests that the Bank may be involved
in some form of disguised or de facto sectoral adjustment lending.
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manner, or at least that may be the perception."' 0 The
issue is whether development banks should finance "social"
loans from the public external debt markets when
governments refuse to do so, or when governments do not
have the means to provide budgetary resources for the
social programs in question. Moreover, increased economic
productivity as a result of such lending is questionable.
Some of these arguments raise imponderable questions that
may not need to be answered in the context of the EBRD in
any event, since the EBRD may not have the financial
wherewithal to make appreciable policy-based loans, given
its relatively small size in comparison to the World
Bank.
311
In the regions served by the Bank, there is a need for an
institution that will take the lead with respect to policy-
based loans. It is unknown whether the IMF will take on
an active role in the long term particularly given the poor
precedent of the Latin American debt crisis. Recently,
however, the Fund made a U.S. $6.4 billion loan to the
Russian Federation, which includes monthly, rather than
the usual quarterly, disbursements by the Fund.3 "2 This
loan is based on numerous conditions intended to promote
economic reform in Russia, including the reform of Russia's
energy sector.313 The World Bank, moreover, recently
approved a loan to the Russian Federation, in an amount
equivalent to U.S. $500 million, for the reform of the
country's petroleum sector.114 Adjustment lending in the
regions served by the EBRD should be closely coordinated
among the multilateral development institutions. 15
3.3. Preferred Creditor Status?
The Bank has made the claim to "preferred creditor
310 This point has been suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
... These counterarguments were suggested by Peter Fox.
312 Steven Erlanger, I.M.F. Agrees to Give Russia $6 Billion Loan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at 4; Russia and the I.M.F.: Fingers Crossed,
ECONOMIST, March 11, 1995, at 50.
313 Erlanger, supra note 312, at 4.
314 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT, RUsSIAN FEDERATION SECOND OIL
REHABILITATION PROJECT (June 13, 1994).
316 See Linarelli, supra note 10, at 395.
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status."3 1 The Bank attempts to mobilize private sector
funds by not involving itself in debt reschedulings for loans
to, or guarantees by, member countries.' Nor will the
Bank reschedule loans to private enterprises where the
inability of the enterprise to pay the debt is based on a
general foreign exchange shortage in the country in which
the enterprise operates. 18 There are several reasons why
the Bank's declaration of its status as a preferred creditor
is questionable.
The term "preferred creditor" is not a term of art in
international law.319 A noncontroversial definition of the
term is as follows:
[T]he term "preferred creditor" refers to external
creditors of sovereign States who are legally entitled
to be given priority among individual creditors or
classes of creditors in relation to the settlement of
external debt. The term will be used only in relation
to creditors who are international persons (i.e.
sovereign States and international organizations) and
whose priority claims are founded on international
law. The corresponding debts that enjoy such
treatment have been called preferential debts, i.e.
those debts which are wholly or proportionally
payable in preference to others.3 2 °
Under this definition, the EBRD would be a preferred
creditor only when acting as a creditor to a state. For
transactions with states, the EBRD also would have to
show that it is legally entitled to such a priority. Since
there is no settled international law on the issue of legal
entitlement to a priority, the question must be answered by
reference to the terms and conditions of loan agreements, or
316 See FINANCING WITH THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 4.
3" See id. at 4; EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 221, at 4.
318 See EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 221, at 4.
311 See Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, Preferred Creditor Status Under
International Law: The Case of the International Monetary Fund, 39
NTL & CoMP. L.Q. 801, 805 (1990).
320 Id. at 806.
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perhaps by reference to the Articles of Agreement of the
Bank. Neither the Bank's Articles of Agreement nor its
Standard Terms and Conditions provide the requisite
designation associated with preferred creditor status. The
EBRD's negative pledge clause does not establish a priority,
it merely establishes equality of treatment among
creditors .21 The Bank, however, has made a preferred
creditor declaration in its non-contractual documen-
tation.1
22
The Bank syndicates loans for private and public sector
borrowers. 23 The World Bank, moreover, has been in-
volved in syndications of loans made to sovereigns.3 24 The
World Bank's documentation for these loans exempts them
from sovereign debt restructuring. 25 This exemption is
controversial, even for the World Bank, which makes only
public sector loans.326  It surely is an even more
controversial issue for the EBRD, particularly with respect
to its private sector loans.
It would appear that the most prudent route for the
Bank to take in order to ensure preferred creditor status
would be to require a binding agreement from its borrowers
to this effect. The Bank's unilateral statements that it has
preferred creditor status will not make it so.327 It would
not be prudent for the Bank to rely on any sort of emerging
norm or opiniojuris on the subject, even though it has been
321 See id. at 806-07.
322 See EXTERNAL FINANCING, supra note 221, at 4; FINANCING WITH
THE EBRD, supra note 14, at 5; TRANSPORT SECTOR, supra note 171, at
37-38. Cf Case c-221/88 European Coal and Steel Community v.
Acciaierie e ferriere Busseni SpA, in which the Court of Justice of the
European Communities held, pursuant to a European Coal and Steel
Community Commission ("ECSC") recommendation, that the ECSC was
entitled to provide itself with a form of preferred creditor status in
bankruptcy cases within EC Member States. The case is distin-
guishable because of its basis in Community law. The EBRD is not, in
the formal legal sense, a Community institution under the relevant
treaties.
323 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
324 See Keith Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Parity of
Treatment Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to Comparable
Debts, 20 INTL LAW. 857, 859 (1986).
3 See id.
326 See id.
321 See Martha, supra note 319, at 816.
[Vol. 16:3434
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss3/1
1995] EBRD AND THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
a matter of practice, or at least an untested assumption,
and accepted by the Paris Club, sovereign nations, commer-
cial creditors, and development bank creditors for many
years.
328
4. THE EBRD, TE EU, AND TRADE: THE EBRD AS A
GEOPOLITICAL INSTITUTION
This Article explores one of the important ways in which
the West has set out to provide aid in a multilateral context
to countries in desperate need.329 In the post-Cold War
order, distinctions between the "political" and the
"economic" are disintegrating.330 The United States, for
example, has sought to link trade and human rights
concerns in its dealings with other countries. 31  The
Tiananmen Square incident severely constrained China's
ability to trade with many countries, as well as its ability
to secure loan assistance from the World Bank.3 2 Indeed,
in the countries served by the EBRD, human rights
violations by communist governments significantly impeded
economic growth.333 With its emphasis on conditionality,
the EBRD can thus be viewed as promoting a new
paradigm in multilateral development institutions.
The EBRD's perceived success or failure will not depend
solely on its own efforts. Even more important factors may
be whether international markets are open for goods and
services of the countries that the EBRD serves, and
whether the countries that the EBRD serves can successful-
ly penetrate such open markets with their goods and
" See Hurlock, supra note 280, at 365-66. See generally Martha,
supra note 319.
" It should be noted that the World Bank, the International
Finance Corporation, and the Asian Development Bank also maintain
operations in some of the same countries as the EBRD. This point has
been suggested by Professor Peter Fox.
330 See Marshall Sonenshine, Time for a Profitable Advance on
Human Rights, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at 15.
331 See, e.g., John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the
Separation of Powers Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 203, 214-20 (1995).
332 See Sonenshine, supra note 330, at 15.
33 See id. (stating that repression of civil liberties undeniably
lessened productivity and initiative in the formerly communist nations).
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services.' Capital transfers must result in net transfers
of wealth, and the success of the borrowing countries in
reconstruction and development depends, in a significant
way, on their ability to export their products.33 Concerns
about overly burdensome debt obligations would be nul-
lified, or at least mitigated, by increased gross national
product caused by increased exports."3 6 Debt becomes a
problem when it cannot be managed by a country, and the
serviceable debt of one country is the "debt crisis" of
another.337
The argument that there would be insufficient demand
for additional products added to the international
marketplace by these countries in transition from
socialism 8  should not be of great concern, as it reflects
what economists call the "lump-of-production fallacy."
33 9
As stated by one writer:
Global production and consumption are not somehow
fixed. Trade increases the output that can be
squeezed from any given collection of resources, and
the consumption that can be obtained from any given
set of production possibilities. The parties at both
ends of the transaction profit. Trade is, in short, a
positive-sum game.340
In the context of regional policy, the transitional countries
... See Clive Crook, The Gains from Trade, A SURVEY OF TEE THIRD
WORLD 25, in ECONOMIsT, Sept. 23, 1989 (citing to insert) [hereinafter
Crook, Gains from Trade].
... See Clive Crook, Distracted by Debt, A SURVEY OF TEE THIRD
WORLD 51, in ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989 (citing to insert) [hereinafter
Crook Distracted by Debt]; see also Crook, Gaines from Trade, supra
note 334, at 25.
336 See Crook, Distracted by Debt, supra note 335, at 51-52.
337 Id.
338 See Clive Crook, How to Leap a Frontier, A SURVEY OF THE
THIRD WORLD 27, 33, in ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 1989 (citing to insert)
(stating that although some have argued that additional exports by
developing countries will lead to protectionist measures in the targeted
markets, an exporter's success depends less upon demand than upon
supp-side efficiency).
Id. at 34.
340 Id.
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served by the Bank have no real choice other than to
compete in the global marketplace in order to maintain any
possibility of increasing their respective gross national
products.
The reconstruction and development of the countries in
question will ultimately be unsuccessful in the absence of
open trade policies in the West, particularly in Europe.
3 4 1
As demonstrated by the economic success stories of Japan,
Taiwan, and Korea, it is unlikely that these countries will
be able to accomplish their transitions without open
markets. Without open trade regimes, the massive
economic problems of the Bank's countries of operations will
only be aggravated, 42 thus hindering the transition from
socialism to democracy and continuing or worsening their
problems with macroeconomic reform.
In response to the need for open trade policy, the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") provides the
germ of an idea - the evolution of trade agreements in
preeminence over aid institutions. Some countries in the
Western Hemisphere have considered the expansion of
NAFTA to Chile and eventually to a significant portion of
Latin America. Although the emphasis in the Western
Hemisphere is on economic, and not political, integration,
the enhancement of democratic public order in the Western
Hemisphere will flow from productive linkages of political
and economic concerns. As demonstrated by NAFTA, the
current trend focuses on trade liberalization as the primary
mover toward long-term reform. The Latin American debt
crisis has, in all likelihood, played an important role in the
shift in focus. Of course, analogizing to the Western
Hemisphere is not perfect for a number of reasons,
including the fact that Latin America is now much better
off, economically and politically, than the EBRD borrowing
countries, and the fact that the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and the World Bank have long played roles in
... See Melanie S. Tammen, Fostering Aid Addiction in Eastern
Europe, in PERPETUATING POVERTY 101, 122-23 (Doug Bandow & Ian
Vds uez eds., 1994).
SCf. Crook, The Gains from Trade, supra note 334, at 25 (stating
that conclusive evidence has shown "an open approach to trade is...
indispensable").
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Latin America. Some, however, have suggested that
development institutions did more harm than good in Latin
America.3
In contrast to the economic inter-American approach, the
European approach places greater emphasis on political
integration. Jacques Attali, the first president of the EBRD
and one of the sources for the idea of a regional develop-
ment institution for Central and Eastern Europe, has said
the EBRD is an "embryo for a European confederation."
3 "
Increasing membership in the EU may shift the source of
aid away from the EBRD and programs such as PHARE
into a regional aid structure that includes the EIB. Aid
without substantial trade liberalization prior to EU mem-
bership may ultimately create EU Member States that are
impoverished in comparison to other Member States and
that require aid in merely another form." One pre-
eminent goal should be to increase economic wealth in the
countries served by the EBRD, which is most effectively
accomplished through substantial trade liberalization.
The EU has by no means ignored the trade aspects of its
relationship with Central and Eastern Europe. Liberalized
trade with countries outside of the EU, however, would be
inconsistent with the concept of the internal European
market. The Union has abolished quantitative trade
restrictions for certain products of some countries, such as
Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.3 46  The EU has granted
... See generally, Paulo R. de Castro, Brazilian Hyperstagflation:
The Case Against Intervention, in PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note
341, at 187-210; Robert S. Le6n, Mexico, Markets, and Multilateral Aid,
in PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 341, at 165-85; Paul C. Roberts,
Development Planning in Latin America: The Lifeblood of the Mercan-
tilist State, in PERPETUATING POVERTY, supra note 341, at 147-63. The
existence of the Inter-American Development Bank was suggested by
Peter Fox.
344 Dunnett, supra note 204, at 574 (quoting French television
interview, Mar. 25, 1991).
311 See Michael Spector, The European Community's Expansion
Mechanism and the Differing Approaches of EFTA and Eastern Europe
to Community Membership, 25 LAW & POL'Y INTL BUS. 335, 351 (1993)
(discussing the problems encountered by Spain and Portugal when
joining the European Community); see generally Vincent J. Ella, The
Visegrad Countries of Central Europe -- Integration or Isolation?, 2
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 229, 241-53 (1993).
346 See van Gerven & Suami, supra note 97, at 152.
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trade preferences under the Generalized System of
Preferences of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
to only a few countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
although coverage may expand in the future. 47 The
Generalized System of Preferences, in this author's opinion,
however, has provided few benefits to developing countries.
The EU has also entered into association agreements with
the Visegrad states of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslova-
kia,3  while individual Member States have entered into
various bilateral trade agreements with Central and East
European states. Jacques Attali, however, has "called for
the EC's association agreements with Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia to be torn up and renegotiated."349
The Bank can attempt to promote the important goal of
trade liberalization in several ways. First, given the Bank's
nature as a development institution, its efforts can be
efficacious on the "supply side" by developing the infrastruc-
ture necessary for export-oriented industries. Second, the
Bank can continue concentrating on the reform of the finan-
cial and banking sectors in its countries of operations. 50
This financial and banking emphasis is a key priority for
the Bank, intended to expand capital markets for the
fledgling enterprises in the Bank's countries of operations.
Third, the Bank can involve itself in legal reform in its
countries of operations. A regular and predictable system
of laws and courts is necessary for economic development,
particularly in attracting foreign investment. Finally,
because many of the enterprises in the EBRD-served
countries do not make products of sufficient quality to be
competitive,"' the Bank can focus on industrial and
manufacturing sector programs designed to increase the
international competitiveness of products made by EBRD-
347 See id. at 152-53 (stating that the EU proposed an extension of
such trade preferences to all PHARE beneficiaries in 1991).
348 The Agreement with Czechoslovakia is subject to renegotiation
due to the split of the country into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
See Spector, supra note 345, at 353-54.
s9Thunder Off, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1992, at 48, 51.
350 See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 7; see also FINAN-
CIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS, supra note 177.
35' See GERHARD POHL & PIRFITA SORSA, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
AND TRADE WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD 54 (1992).
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served countries. It will remain the predominant function
of sovereign states, however, to deal with the "demand side"
by ensuring open markets for competitive products from the
borrowing countries of the EBRD.
5. CONCLUSION
Several conclusions emerge from this Article. First,
discourse or inquiry should be distinguished from ac-
tion. 52 From the perspective of inquiry, the EBRD is
indeed a remarkable multilateral institution. It could not
have been created at the time of Bretton Woods, or, for that
matter, at any time during the Cold War. The importance
of the institution per se, in terms of its potential impact on
the development of international or supranational norms,
may be significant.353
Second, the Bank is a significant and recent manifes-
tation of multilateralism. There have been three manifes-
tations in multilateralism, in the areas of trade, aid, and
politics. The Bank predominantly reflects multilateralism
in the aid realm, as well as the political realm. 4 Other
significant manifestations of multilateralism in the political
realm are the post-Cold War United Nations Security
Council activities, the CSCE, and the EU. There is a
confluence of interest between the Bank's political con-
ditionality and the EU's political criteria for member-
ship. 5 The Bank's political mandate ultimately should
reinforce country efforts to join the EU.56
Third, from the perspective of action, the Bank is
constrained to provide aid in a manner substantially similar
to that provided by the existing multilateral financial
institutions. The Bank is constrained further by its capital
base which makes it smaller than the World Bank. The
352 This discourse or inquiry versus action analysis is suggested by
John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the
Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law & Development
Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 481-82 (1977).
"' See Head, supra note 9, at 606.
354 See supra section 2.2.
311 See Steve Peers, An Even Closer Waiting Room?: The Case for
Eastern European Accession to the European Economic Area, 32
COMmON MKT. L. REv. 187, 187 (1995).
356 See id.
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Bank nonetheless serves a vital capital-accessing function
for its borrowing countries. This function is accomplished
by the Bank's role as a "catalyst" or "demonstrator" for
private sector investment in its borrowing countries, and in
its role in developing the infrastructure necessary for
market economies."' The Bank's capital-accessing func-
tion, however, must be coupled with economic incentives for
the countries in which the Bank operates, such as trade
liberalization. Aid without open international trading
regimes for the EBRD-served countries is insufficient for
economic, as well as political, development. The tran-
sitional countries at issue need economic expansion, for
economic expansion is vital in avoiding a debt crisis similar
to that experienced by Latin American countries in the
1980s.
Fourth, the Bank's political conditionality is a significant
legal construct, but may not have real long run effects in
the borrowing countries. It is the possibility of EU mem-
bership that will be the strongest motivation for countries
to ensure democracy, political pluralism, and respect for
human rights. The Bank's Articles of Agreement are
contemporary in approach and, in any event, are consistent
with current development economics theories. Although the
Bank has taken on its political tasks primarily by
monitoring the political developments of its borrowing
countries, the Bank's political mandate provides it with the
discretion necessary to avoid the debacles that the World
Bank experienced when it made loans to countries with
governments accused of human rights violations.
Finally, the Bank's Articles of Agreement expressly set
forth the mandate of sustainable development. Environ-
mental concerns are paramount in today's development
scene and the borrowing countries of the EBRD have
suffered particularly from a history of incredible environ-
mental devastation. The EBRD has taken on an assertive
role in applying its environmental conditionality. The
EBRD has the unique opportunity to develop pan-European
approaches to dealing with the environment.
It is too early to assess the impact of the EBRD. Its
35' See supra section 3.2.1.; Linarelli, supra note 10, at 389-91.
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private sector mandate, however, may have effects beyond
the specific projects that it undertakes. The Bank, with its
approach to development that requires political and
economic freedom, as well as sustainable development, may
present the world with a positive model for international
development institutions. Let us hope that the Bank
succeeds in its mission.
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